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Chapter I   Introduction 
A. Overview 
 To effectively enforce a given right, the right holder needs to focus on two factors: 
the first factor concerns ex ante precaution, which means making prohibitive rules 
that aim at any kind of violations. The second one, more importantly, concerns 
efficient ex post remedies which compensate the losses of right holders as a result of 
infringements. In the context of copyright, such framework remains the same. 
Copyright damages, inter alia, function as a highly important role in copyright law for 
enforcement. For one, copyright damages can give prevailing party actual 
benefits---monetary compensation. Such benefits can preserve sufficient incentives 
for right holders to continue creation of new works. For another, significant amount of 
damages no doubt deprive infringers of unjust enrichment and deter future violation.1 
Under the circumstances, copyright damages primarily design for the protection of 
copyright and maintaining the progress of culture. However, unexpected situation 
appears when copyright steps into digital age. The scenario below will illustrate the 
case. 
 Imagine a popular singer recently publishes several CDs that contain dozens of 
new songs. He of course wishes to recoup the profits from these songs to the utmost 
after marketing. Everything goes well until one day he notices that one peer-to-peer 
platform--“Free Listening”--uploads his songs without authorization and allows 
online users to download for free. Such action irritates the singer and he accordingly 
1 See H.R. No. 94-1476, ¶ 3 “Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from 
the infringement and profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a 
wrongful act.” 
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decides to file lawsuit. The purpose of the filing is self-evident: imposing penalty on 
infringers who violate the exclusive rights and obtaining compensation. Obviously, 
the most proper remedy under current copyright law is the damages.  
 Nevertheless, facing online copyright infringement needs to consider several 
issues if one decide to rely on such remedy to enforce exclusive rights: Who should 
be the major targets for imposing damages? The P2P platform may be the target, but it 
does not directly earn profits through infringement; Individual end-users, on the other 
hand, primarily seek for non-commercial enjoyment even if they directly infringe 
copyrighted songs. Both groups do not obtain commercial profits by infringement. So, 
these situations add difficulty for proving the illegal profits. Then what about the 
actual damages? One can claim the lost sales of CD because of the P2P file-sharing 
platform, but speculations still exist: does the dissemination really account for all the 
lost sales? What if other market elements affect the sales?  
 Even if one can simply choose statutory damages regardless any proof, the final 
awarding may still be problematic. First of all, each song can be counted as single 
work for statutory damages when separately uploaded. So, the final awarding would 
be astronomical even if courts grant the lower end--$750 per infringed work.2 
Compared with retail price of each CD, such awarding is unjust and departs from 
compensating purpose. The situation becomes even worse when targeting on 
individual end-users. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset is the very case in point. 
A single, household mother had to pay $220,000 --$9,250 per infringed song--to the 
2 17 U.S.C. § 504 (b). 
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copyright holder as statutory damages.3 
 To cure these problems, a quick answer is awarding copyright damages under the 
correct understanding of property rules, and limiting excessive statutory damages. 
This answer can better achieve purpose of sufficient compensation and effective 
deterrence. In general, the aforementioned problematic situations are largely due to 
the impact by digital technologies as well as online environment.  
 Tracing back of copyright history, new emerging technologies always challenge 
the perceptions of copyright and arises new problems. Digital technologies bring 
about speedy and widespread distribution, easy and costless copying, high volume of 
compression and global accessibility, etc. These advanced features by digital 
technologies gradually change both the perceptions of copyright and the balance 
between disparate groups. Each group wants to maximize their interests by exploiting 
these technologies.  
 Historically, copyright holders never remain silence when new technologies 
facilitate infringement and intimidate their business models as well as profit channels. 
When it comes to digital technologies, right holders react the same. Over the past 
years, the Recording Industry of Association America (RIAA) struggled to combat 
against online copyright piracy through digital technologies.4 The RIAA found the 
advanced technologies greatly threaten their high-profits industry. Hence, the RIAA 
3 579 F.Supp.2d 1210, at 1227 (D. Minn.2008). 
4  Will Moseley, A New (Old) Solution For Online Copyright Enforcement After Thomas and 
Tenenbaum, 25 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 311 2010 (stating that RIAA file suits separately against 
individual end-users who illegal download and distribute musical files and OSP that facilitate 
unauthorized music sharing).  
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filed large amount of lawsuits against individual end-users who downloaded, 
distributed unauthorized music online as well as Online Service Providers (OSPs). 
They won in several cases such as A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 5 and MGM 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,6, forced them to shut down or go bankruptcy. The war of 
litigation to individual end-users, however, proved to be ineffective, costly and even 
harmful to RIAA’s commercial image. At the end of 2008, RIAA announced to cease 
the seven-year long litigation against individual end-users as a result of the 
ineffectiveness of statutory damages to online copyright infringement.7  
 Current copyright damages contain two segments. Damages upon actual damages 
or/and illegal profits; statutory damages. To award damages upon actual damages, the 
plaintiff needs to prove decreasing sales caused by infringements. Such proof, 
however, usually tends to be unreliable because of the distinctive features on digital 
works. As to illegal profits, the problem becomes more complicated because OSPs 
and P2P platforms rarely gain profits by direct infringements. On the other hand, 
statutory damages sometimes cause unjust, inconsistent and excessive awarding.8 
Such results do not squarely fits into the requirement of optimal compensation and 
effective deterrence; ultimately cause chilling effect on technology innovation and 
culture progress. In addition to practical problems, the rationality of copyright 
damages is questionable. After all, current framework is designed for copyright 
5 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
6 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
7 See Moseley, supra note 4, at 311-312.  
8 Anna Cronk, The punishment Doesn’t fit the Crime—Why and How Congress Should Revise the 
Statutory Copyright Damages Provision for Noncommercial Infringements on Peer-to-Peer 
File-Sharing Networks, 39 SW. L. REV. 181 (2009-2010). 
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infringements occurred in pre-digital age. Therefore, copyright damages indeed need 
further consideration and reassessment. 
 Traditionally, copyright share the features of property. Specifically, copyright 
holders enjoy highly exclusive rights to exclude others from exploiting their works. In 
theory, injunction is the representative of property rules. Damages, on the other hand, 
operate under liability rules because damages primarily design for sufficient 
compensation. Copyright damages, to the contrary, not only compensate the right 
holders, but impose additional punishment so as to deprive unjust enrichment. Under 
the circumstances, the infringers have to resume free-market transaction because of 
their unprofitable condition. This is similar to the concept of property rules: one who 
wants to remove an entitlement cannot simply pay the price after the removal.9 He 
should negotiate with the owner and reach agreement for the transaction.10 Therefore, 
the effect of copyright damages comes closely to property rules.  
 Stepping into digital age, the conclusion remains the same. Each copyright holder 
regards their online works as personal property and seeks to effectively enforce their 
copyright online. They frequently depend on damages for enforcement when 
infringements occur, yet the high frequency eventually lead to unreasonable results. 
The reason lies in the misunderstanding of property rules and the application of such 
misunderstanding to copyright damages. Never a property owner can internalize all 
positive externalities. So, copyright holders should not rely on damages to internalize 
9 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1971-1972). 
10 Id.  
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all positive externalities from their online works so long as they are sufficiently 
compensated. Theoretically, copyright law is enacted to “promote the progress of 
science and useful arts”.11 Hence, permitting some free riding online will better 
achieve the purpose because most copyright creations rely on preexisting works. 
 Whether copyright damages are efficient lies in how the final awarding affects 
disparate groups. On one hand, copyright holders need sufficient compensation to 
preserve incentive for further creation. Lacks of such incentive, no one are willing to 
continue creation because free riding frustrate their motivation. Under the 
circumstances, the society will have a gradual narrower public domain and less 
available resources. On the other hand, copyright damages should deter infringement 
by make infringers unprofitable. As a result, infringers will choose to obtain license 
from copyright holders rather than commit infringement. Therefore, copyright 
damages should both achieve two requirements: sufficient compensation and effective 
deterrence. 
B. Methodology and Research Scope 
 The method of this thesis is generally literature research. Judicial cases, statutes 
and legal articles will be used. In addition to the above materials, the thesis also 
covers some results of surveys with respect to RIAA lawsuits against individual 
end-users. The reaction by individual end-users will illustrate this problematic strategy. 
This thesis generally describes online technologies and analyzes the framework of 
infringement in the context of technology background. The core section of thesis is 
11 U.S. CONST. art.I, §8, cl.8.  
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the analysis of copyright damages in online environment with relevant problems and 
the accordingly suggestions. Moreover, since copyright damages strongly correlates to 
property rules, the thesis also looks into the relation between copyright damages and 
property rules, trying to clarify a correct guidance for effective damages to online 
infringement.  
C. Framework of Thesis 
 Chapter II of this thesis contains two sections. The first section focuses on three 
major features of advanced digital technologies—easy reproduction, speedy 
distribution and high volume compression. The description denotes how these 
technologies change the traditional perceptions of copyright. The second section 
discusses the framework of online copyright infringement in the context of digital 
technologies. To facilitate the analysis, this section divides infringements into two 
categories: direct infringement and indirect infringement. Each category focuses on 
two major groups in online environment: online service providers (OSPs) and 
individual end-users. These groups are frequently involved in online activities and 
most likely to be the targets of copyright damages. An analysis from such perspective 
can facilitate discussion in following chapters. 
 Chapter III first introduces the basic framework of copyright damages: 1) actual 
damages or/and illegal profits; 2) statutory damages. Each category concentrates on 
its respectively operation with accompanied cases for illustration. The second portion 
analyzes their application in online environment. The analysis based on two 
categories: damages upon actual damages or/and illegal profits; statutory damages. 
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For the first category, the analysis focuses more on theoretical aspects; the second 
category covers recent cases and several surveys for illustration. 
 Chapter IV temporarily steps back from discussion in the context of online 
background and traces back the origin of damages: property rules & liability rules. 
Since property rules are traditionally dominant in copyright law, this chapter 
emphasizes more on the interaction between property rules and copyright damages. 
The chapter first describes basic concept of property rules and liability rules, then 
compares their distinctions. The chapter also describes the dominance of property 
rules and exception of liability rules in copyright law. Finally, the chapter will discuss 
whether these perceptions can be squarely fits into online environment. The purpose 
is to figure out how copyright damages should operate under a correct, updating 
guidance as a response to current online infringements. This general guidance serves 
as premise to the analysis in next chapter. 
 Chapter V first introduces the analysis of effective damages model to online 
copyright infringement. The model is based on the analysis from last chapter and 
copyright policies. A general damages model can become a theoretical guideline to 
problems from current copyright damages. The second part looks into more specific 
suggestions on respective problems. The suggestions separately focus on the two 
categories of copyright damages. 
 Chapter VI is the conclusion. Based on the above analysis, it concludes that 
current copyright damage are enacted in pre-digital age and thus outmoded for online 
environment. Moreover, the misunderstanding of property rules worsens the 
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application of copyright damages to online infringement. Apparently, the application 
needs to be modified so as to better adapt to the challenges imposed by digital 
technologies as well as to achieve copyright policies. 
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Chapter II Evolving Landscape and Emerging Challenge in the New Digital     
Era 
Throughout history, the interesting interplay between copyright law and 
technologies is particularly similar to a real race: the technologies always keep on 
emerging and evolving, leading the head of struggling copyright law. The copyright 
law, to the contrary, tries to chase technologies even though lag behind again and 
again. Like Justice Stevens stated in the case Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., “…from its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response 
to significant changes in technology…”12, which denotes the passive position of 
copyright law in the competition.  
Copyright originally correlates with reproducing right. However, the evolving 
reproducing technologies from printing machine to photography until online “one-clip” 
e-copy radically reshape the perceptions of copyright holders and users as well as 
business models. Since new reproducing technologies broaden the media of 
copyrighted works, right holders are keen on expanding new markets and seeking for 
broader protection. Such actions result in the modification of copyright law. Similar 
situation also occurs in other technologies. The emergence of digital technologies 
challenges the foundation of copyright law again. From fixation requirement to 
infringement liability, copyright law is undergone substantial debate by commentators, 
lawmakers and judges before drawing a clear conclusion. As a result, new rules come 
into play for better copyright enforcement. Every time when a free rider intends to 
12 See generally 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) (stating the interrelation between copyright and new 
technology). 
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circumvent penalty by updating technologies, the rules always operate as responses. 
Among varieties of new rules, the most notable concerns online infringement 
liability. Generally, the traditional framework does not fit squarely into online 
infringement even though the analysis originated from the traditional framework. For 
example, a line of cases from Napster, Amister13 and Grokster gradually changed the 
standard of secondary liability. Thanks to the timely modification, copyright damages 
as well as other remedies are able to function in digital era, yet awkwardly.  
This chapter will divide into three sections. The first section introduces three 
major features of new digital technology that change the traditional landscape of 
copyright system. These features are distinguished from their counterparts in the 
analog age. Hence, the comparison between the old and new technology will be 
beneficial to subsequent analysis--the necessity of modifying the existing damage rule. 
Meanwhile, as the premise of copyright damages, it is essential to clarify the criteria 
of liability to online infringement. Therefore, the second section discusses how the 
technologies force copyright law to react accordingly. 
A. Breakthrough to Copyright System: Advanced Digital Technology  
The origin of modern copyright law was the enactment of Statute of Anne, which 
was the earliest among common law countries.14 However, the enactment of such 
statute was largely due to technology breakthrough. In mid-fifteenth century, the 
moveable-type Gutenberg machine remarked a milestone in printing technology. It 
13 In re Amister, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).  
14 Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International intellectual Property System, 38 LOY. 
L .A. REV. 323, 330-54 (2004). 
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greatly reduced the cost of printing process and made reproduction more effectively.15 
Two trends were subsequently triggered by such invention: for one, sharp growth of 
printing plants came into being and more literary works were created to meet the 
growing demand. For another, printing industries gradually cared for their profits, 
which eventually lead to the grant of copyright—limited monopoly on printing. 
Apparently, technology growth gave birth to copyright and pushed the evolution. As 
time went on, a variety of inventions came into being: photocopiers, film, radio, cable 
television, etc. Their contribution concentrated on reproduction and distribution 
technologies. In general, the cost of communication is greatly reduced, information 
flows increased, diversity of works are possible and high-quality copies can be 
expected.  
Digital technologies make the progress more reliable and effective. Generally, 
digital technologies can be defined as digitization. The process transforms analog data 
into digital formation which can be stored or transmitted by digital device like 
computer.16 Almost every kind of works can be digitized, such as an image, sound or 
text.17 Due to digitization, digital technologies offer three major features including 
ease of reproduction, speedy distribution and high volume of compression. However, 
digitization gradually becomes a double-edge weapon even though it stimulates the 
creation of works and facilitates dissemination because copyright holders realize that 
15Brendan Sccot, Copyright in a Frictionless World, FIRST MONDAY, 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/887/796 (last updated Jul. 6, 
2006). 
16 Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law and Technology of 
Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART& ENT. L. 1, 4 (2001). 
17 Id.  
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their works can be easily access, copy and distribute than ever.  
1. Reproduction 
Before digitization comes into play, high-quality copy of work is almost 
unavailable. Copying one work from the original always leads to imperfect result. For 
example, a photograph will show grains on the surface if enlarged sufficiently; sound 
will generate some noise when recorded from a microphone into a tape recorder.18 
Digitization, however, creates perfect copies which can be used for further duplication 
in high quality. For example, a photograph produced from digital camera can be 
transmitted and stored in personal computer with equivalent definition and rarely 
degrade the quality. A photocopy, however, gradually blur its image with increasing 
times of duplication. 
Perfect reproduction lies in the operation of machine-readable language. 
Machine-readable language consists of merely one and zero, which is distinguished 
from human-readable language. Since almost every kind of information can be turned 
into machine-readable language, verbatim duplication actually exists. In this case, 
users can enjoy works in the same quality by reproduction. Moreover, the copying 
process can be easily completed from several seconds to minutes on personal 
computer. This situation no doubt becomes the nightmare to copyright holders. 
According to the demonstration from the plaintiff in Napster, at least 87% of the files 
on the platform were copyrighted and reproduced without authorization.19 Similar 
situation occurred in software industry. Business software publishers lose 
18 Id.  
19 Napster, 239. F.3d, at 1013. 
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approximately $7 to$12 billion annually due to piracy. They claimed that each 
purchased software CD could be reproduced for additional three to seven copies 
within the circle of family or friends.20 When copyright holders want to enforce their 
rights by pursuing these people, they may confront with thousands of individual 
end-users. Under the circumstances, the measurement of actual damages becomes 
difficult and questionable because no physical copies exist for calculation. Also, the 
enforcement costs on individual infringement are usually too high for right holders. 
Even large copyright entities, such as the RIAA, would find the massive lawsuits 
against individual end-users ineffective.  
2. Distribution  
The internet and information communication technology (ITC) burgeon a new 
platform for copyright system. The internet provides users with full accessibility and 
widespread connection. Over the past decades, the internet gradually became an 
“advanced high speed, interactive, broadband, digital communications system” and 
incorporates most current information networks. 21 Early in 1996, the internet 
connected more than two million computers and over twenty million users 
worldwide.22 Until March 2011, the total population of “e-citizens” is more than two 
billion.23 Furthermore, disseminating materials does not cost internet users a lot and 
20 Jayashri Srikantiah, the Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive Copying 
Technology, 71 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1634, 1635 (1996).   
21 The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights: Intellectual Property and the 
National Information Infrastructure, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/  (last 
updated Aug.01, 2007). 
22 See Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 1636. 
23Internet Usage Statistics: World Internet Users and Population Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (lase updated Apr. 28, 2012). 
14 
 
                                                        
does not sorely belong to the publishers any more. A survey conducted in 2003 by 
Pew Internet and American Life Project pointed out that 44% of U.S. internet users 
had the experience of uploading materials online.24 Forty percent of them only have 
annual income of $30,000 or less.25 Because each user can easily access and process 
copyrighted works, the quantities of users imposes heavy burden to copyright holders 
for their enforcement.  
On the other hand, the ITC keeps on evolving from the very beginning of its 
emergence. A high profile example was the bulletin board. A personal computer with 
valid internet connection plus bulletin board software can create a platform to 
exchange information. Such easy operation enables most users to upload or download 
large amounts of digitized works at low cost such as a text file, a sound recording or 
an image.26 As a result, copyright holders suffer from substantial losses. One case in 
point that happened in 1994 when a college student in Minnesota uploaded thousands 
of copyrighted software onto his bulletin board and allowed other users to download 
them freely, which claimed for $1.5 billion losses of software sales.27  
With the development of digital technologies, online users call for more efficient 
ITC platform to increase their enjoyment. The peer-to-peer (P2P) platform is the very 
technology that satisfies their requirement. The P2P technology enables users to 
upload or download materials in great volume and high speed than ever. The 
24 Amanda Lenhart, Content Creation Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,  
http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2004/Content-Creation-Online.aspx. (last updated Feb. 29, 
2004).  
25 Id. 
26 See Srikantiah, supra note 9, at1636. 
27 Barbara Carton, Man Charged in Software Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1994, at 41.  
15 
 
                                                        
development of P2P technology had gone through two major phases: centralized 
indexing and decentralized indexing.28 Early in the mid-1990, programmers began to 
design networks that facilitated their clients for internet activities.29 Such technology 
only allowed users to retrieve contents from a given network and users could not 
transmit contents back.30 Such centralized file-sharing platform, however, can be 
easily used for online infringements.  
To immune from infringement liability, technicians updated their file-sharing 
platform into a more advanced version—decentralized, user-driven platform,31 such 
as the Grokster platform. The mechanism is simple. A user merely need to download 
and install the P2P software into his personal computer, and then create an account. 
When he logs onto the account, he can upload or download contents with other users 
who have different accounts regardless their specific location. Compared with the 
centralized system, the decentralized system requires less administration by the 
system providers.  
From bulletin board to P2P file-sharing platform, evolving digital technologies 
greatly reshapes traditional perception of copyright system. Online users now can 
access and process works costless than ever because of the removal of physical copies. 
Also, the “first-sale doctrine” becomes meaningless because online users can still 
retain electronic copies after the distribution online. Moreover, online users can 
28 Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. & In re Amister Litigation: A Study of 
Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-to-Peer Context, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 485, 491 (2005). 
29 Id. at 489.  
30 Id. 
31 Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Amister & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony 
Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 26 (2004). 
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simultaneously access contents and repeated their actions all the time, which increases 
the opportunities of illegal use and enhances the difficulty of detection. Therefore, 
these features can be problematic to each right holder when it comes to enforcement 
issue. 
3. Compression 
To be eligible for copyright protection, a given work needs to be fixed on certain 
media after creation. Before the appearance of digital media, all copyrighted works 
are fixed on physical media. Physical media usually cannot cover so many contents as 
digital media. Just image the high volumes of case reporters in a law library compared 
with popular legal database like Westlaw or LexisNexis. Advanced compression 
technology now enables extremely large quantity of contents to be stored in small, 
manageable size. Moving Picture Experts Group’s mpeg-1 audio layer 3 algorithm 
(MP3) was the very example of progressive compression.32 MP3 is a standard 
compression unit that allows music files to be compressed in a size of one to twelfth 
of the original version.33 Another similar compression device for video is DiVX, 
which compresses a 5 gigabyte DVD into 650 megabytes CD-R.34 Furthermore, the 
popular iPod-Nano exemplifies the feature of high quantity storage in small size. This 
digital media player was introduced in late 2005 and has gone through six generations. 
The latest sixth generation have s storage of 16GB with only 1.54 inch square 
display.35 
32 See Kramarsky, supra note 16, at 7. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35IPod Nano, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPod_Nano#Sixth_generation (last updated May. 
17 
 
                                                        
 Compression of huge information laid a good foundation for further 
dissemination online. An entire uploaded CD with musical files can be downloaded 
into one MP3 within twenty minutes.36 Based on the statistics, one can anticipate that 
the impact on copyright holders by using a 64G IPod for downloading from a P2P 
file-sharing platform.  
Ease of reproduction, speedy distribution and high volume compression challenge 
traditional copyright system and threaten each copyright holder. Making an electronic 
copy online simply requires several “clicks” and cost merely several seconds or 
minutes. The quality of electronic copy can totally fulfill the need of users due to 
perfect duplication: no noise in sound track or blurring in image. Furthermore, large 
amounts of users can easily access and process online works simultaneously. Anyone 
from a CEO to a household wife can become illegal users because of the low costs. 
Moreover, new and evolving network platforms facilitate the process. Finally, 
renovated digital devices increase information storage on one hand, facilitates online 
illegal dissemination on the other hand.  
Evolving digital technologies bring about challenging features that can be 
deemed as double-edge weapons. It stimulates the creation of works, accelerates the 
dissemination of information and facilitates accessibility of users. However, the threat 
out of unauthorized use still exists and gradually become rampant on the internet. To 
make matter worse, online infringements do not share equivalent features as offline 
infringers. Some online infringers do not fall squarely into the traditional standard of 
19, /2012).  
36 See Kramarsky, supra note 16, at 7. 
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liability. Therefore, clarifying a proper standard of liability to online infringement 
serves as premise to the analysis of copyright damages. 
B. Direct Infringement in New Environment 
Traditionally, copyright infringement originates from direct infringement. In 
theory, it occurs when anyone except for the copyright holders exercise the exclusive 
rights without authorization. This framework fits into almost every jurisdiction in the 
world. For example, §106 of US 1976 Copyright Act recognizes six exclusive rights 
to copyright owner: reproduction; adaption; distribution; publicly perform, publicly 
display and digital audio transmission of sound recording.37 If an accused commits 
action that falls within the above enumerated rights without authorization, he infringes 
the copyright. Therefore, the framework of copyright infringement can be roughly 
defined as follow: 1) valid copyright and ownership; 2) unauthorized exploitation of 
statutory exclusive copyright. 
Despite digital technology has changed the landscape of copyright system and 
brought about unexpected side effects, the framework of infringement still remain the 
same when applied to online environment. Online platform in nature functions for 
storage and transmission, just as offline media. No distinction exists between a 
musical website and a physical CD when both are used for storage of pirated songs. 
Currently there are two types of direct infringements online: 1) infringement by OSPs; 
2) infringement by individual end-users. The basic framework of the first type is esay 
to define. Judge Rakoff in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. pointed out, “the 
37 17 U.S.C. §106. 
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complex marvels of cyberspatial communication ay create difficult legal issues; but 
not in this case. Defendant’s infringement of plaintiff’s copyright is clear.”38 The 
second type develops with the emergence of internet and ITC, and embraces its 
popularization when P2P file-sharing platforms come into being. Two recent cases, 
Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset39and Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. 
Tenenbuam40, cause heated debate on the reasonability of lawsuits against individual 
end-users. 
1. Direct infringement by OSPs 
Online Service Providers, known as OSPs, offer variety of services to online 
users. For example: E-commerce, online entertainment (music, movie, etc.), online 
communication (e-mail, live-chat, etc.), information search (Google, Wikipedia, 
Baidu, etc.) Almost every kind of service contains copyright contents. Hence, OSPs 
can easily infringe copyright by intent or negligent. In offline world, an individual 
entity can become the source for distribution of pirated copies, such as CD shopping 
site along the street, flea market, etc. As to online environment, the situation remains 
the same. A single website can store thousands of pirated works and serve as source 
for further distribution. The MP3.com case is a high profile example. 
MP3.com was a professional website which stored and distributed music to its 
users, and offered relevant information as well as technology support online. In 
January 2000, the MP3.com launched a new service called “My.MP3.com” which 
38 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, at 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
39 680 F. Supp.2d, 1045 (2010).  
40 672 F. Supp.2d, 217 (2009). 
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allowed legal CD purchasers to convert the songs from their CDs to the website. In 
exchange for the uploading, they could also freely access to songs from other CDs. 41 
Soon after the MP3.com converted “tens of thousands of popular CDs” into the MP3 
format and stored them on its servers.42 The only requirement for users to access 
those songs was to prove either 1) they legally own the CD or 2) purchase a CD from 
MP3.com affiliate retailers online.43 Although the operation continued, several record 
companies sued MP3.com for infringement of their sound recording copyright. 
The court held in favor of plaintiffs and stated that the defendant actually copied 
the converted version of songs from plaintiffs’ CDs, and replayed them to its users 
without permission from copyright owners. 44 This action violated the exclusive 
rights recognized in §106 of Copyright Act. 45 Though MP3.com argued for “fair use” 
defense, the court rejected for the following reasons: 1) the defendant was commercial 
in nature; 2) the copying action harmed the value of plaintiff’s work and their 
potential market; 3) MP3.com copied entire portion of works; 4) the works being 
copied “close to the core of copyright protection”.46  
Similarly, another OSP in China committed the same action like MP3.com. In 
Dec.2006, Columbia Pictures found the Sohu.com, a popular online service provider, 
offered its users unauthorized access to online video database. 47 Such video database 
41 92 F.Supp.2d, at 350. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 353. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 351-52. 
47 Columbia Pictures v. Sohu.com, Beijing First Intermediate Court, 27 Dec. 2006, Yi Zhong Min Chu 
Zi No. 11932 (2006). 
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contained hundreds of copyrighted movies from Columbia Pictures and other 
studios.48 The Columbia Picture subsequently filed a suit against Sohu.com, claiming 
that such unauthorized access and online live playing of those movies committed 
copyright infringement.49 The court ruled the Sohu.com had infringed Columbia 
Pictures’ rights of communication through information networks, which is recognized 
in the 2006 Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Network Dissemination of 
Information. 50 Specifically, Sohu.com provided unauthorized access of the online 
video to its users for playing, yet did not get permission from Colombia Pictures. As a 
copyright holder, Columbia Pictures was entitled to the protection of right to network 
dissemination. Any performance of the works through information network should 
obtain permission form Columbia Pictures.51 Therefore, the court ordered Sohu.com 
published public apology on its home page for consecutive three days and paid RMB 
191,000 (US$23,000) as damage. 52 
Direct infringement by OSPs mostly occurred in early digital age. For one, OSPs 
offer a higher level of service due to the progressive features by digital technologies 
so that many online users were attracted by the enjoyment, which increase the 
opportunity of infringement. For another, such infringement share equivalent features 
to offline direct infringement, and can be easily defined. Courts among different 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 See Art. 2, 18 (1) of 2006 Network Regulation. Full texts and English Translation are available at 
http://bl-law-komodo.ads.iu.edu:2252/display.aspx?id=5224&lib=law&SearchKeyword=copyright&Se
archCKeyword=. 
51 See Sohu.com., at 1.  
52 Id. at 5.  
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jurisdictions tended to fits traditional standard of liability into cyberspace and 
expanded the protection of copyright owners so as to enforce their rights. In general, 
online service providers committed infringement the same as other infringement in 
offline environment. The transformation of physical works into “one or zero” binary 
code, though revolutionary, does not change the nature of such infringement. OSPs 
ordinarily focus on commercial benefits and sometimes cause financial harm to 
copyright holders. Although such financial harm often serves as a reliable basis to 
claim for damages, the measurement of such harm is not simple. Next chapter looks 
into specific problems of the measurement.   
2. Direct infringement by individual end-users 
Although online service providers play an important role in cyberspace and are 
still undergone evolution, their infringements are less frequently found in recent 
judicial practice. This is partly due to the “Safe Harbor” provision that immunes OSPs 
liability, partly because of technology progress enable OSPs functions more like a 
bridge than a warehouse. Therefore, copyright holders need to shift their attention to 
another group who most likely committed direct infringement: individual end-users.  
Individual end-users existed since the creation of valid information network on 
the internet. A personal computer with valid network connection makes private 
exploitation of online works possible. So, copyright infringement by end-users 
appeared in the early age of cyberspace. For example, sending an e-mail with 
copyrighted works committed infringement of distribution right, and the receiving of 
works leads to the violation of reproduction right. With the emergence and updating 
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of P2P technology, more and more individual end-users may infringe copyright 
online. 
Direct infringement by individual end-users is distinguished from those by OSPs. 
Despite the rapid growth of OSPs, the quantities of direct infringements still are less 
than. The establishment of a valid online service provider demands protocols like 
TCP/IP and RADIUS, domain name service (DNS), several size service running 
software (Red Hat Linux), email address, etc.53 To access the internet, by contrast, 
one simply need a valid network connection with personal computer. So, the ease of 
becoming end-users greatly increases the opportunities for online infringement and 
thus causes harm to copyright holders. In Napster, the district court ruled that 
defendant’s users were engaged in wholesale reproduction and distribution of 
copyrighted works.54 The plaintiff also submitted a survey by its expert, Michael Fine, 
to show the irreparable harm caused by illegal file-sharing.55 The survey indicated 
that online file-sharing had resulted in big losses of “album” sales around college 
markets.56  
Looking into the members of individual end-users, large commercial infringers 
and non-commercial home-style ones consist of the group. Therefore, complicated 
structure is another feature. Under the circumstances, rough punishment without 
discretion would increase the costs of enforcement and lead to unjust results. The 
53 Boatner Howell, What do I need to start an ISP?—Essential Items and Industrial Knowledge, 
ALLIANCE DATA.COM, http://www.alliancedatacom.com/isp/start_isp.asp (last updated May.24, 2012). 
54 See 239 F .3d, at 1004.  
55 Id. at 1017-1018. 
56 Id.  
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famous trade organization, Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA), 
began a legal campaign against individual end-users in 2003.57 Over the past five 
years, RIAA had filed lawsuits against approximately 35,000 individual end-users.58 
Since large quantities of end-users were charged without being distinguished, some of 
them were inevitably imposed unjust punishment. In the verdict of Thomas trial, the 
jury found willfully infringement by the defendant and awarded $220,000 in total for 
statutory damages, with $9,250 per work.59 After the defendant filed a motion for 
new trial, the figures increased to $80,000 per work ($1,920,000 in total), regardless 
of the fact that defendant is a single, household mother who only infringed 24 songs.60  
Pursing individual end-users for infringement proves to be costly and ineffective. 
In the late 2008, the RIAA’s announcement of ceasing lawsuits against individual 
end-users remarked the failure of the five-year campaign. For one, the RIAA 
spokesman admitted that the record labels had lost money in the campaign. 61 For 
another, the campaign caused aversions from public and negative comments from 
courts.62 As Judge James Otero commented in Elektra v. O’Brien 63, “…in these 
57 See Moseley, supra note 4, at 311.  
58 Id. at 316. 
59 680 F. Supp at 1049. 
60 Id.  
61 Eric Bangeman, RIAA Anti-P2P Campaign a Real Money Pit, According to Testimony, ARSM 
TECHNIA, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/10/music-industry-exec-p2p-litigation-is-a-money-pit.ars 
(last updated Oct. 3, 2007). 
62 Ray Beckerman, Thoughtful decision in 2007 Californian case, Elektra v. O’Brien, INTERNET LAW 
& REGULATION,  
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2008/01/thoughtful-decision-in-2007-california.html 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2008).   
63 No. 06-5289 (C.D. Cal. March 2, 2007). 
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lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual defenses are not being litigated, and 
instead, the federal judiciary is being used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs 
to pound settlements out of unrepresented defendants…”64  
C. Indirect Infringement: from traditional liability to new concept  
Indirect infringement is not new. Rather, it existed before the emergence of digital 
technologies and internet. Basically, one can be liable as a related infringer of other’s 
infringement activities. 65 Such concept originated from the liability of tort law 
because copyright infringement is tort in nature.66 When it comes to the digital age, 
however, the indirect infringement causes some confusion to current standard of 
liability. Under the circumstances, lawmakers and judges have to reexamine the rule 
and make modification.  
Generally, the 1976 US Copyright Act does not provide statutory framework for 
indirect copyright infringement. The existing framework originated from courts’ 
holding which developed from common law of torts. Traditional indirect liability in 
tort law covers contributory infringement and vicarious liability. The contributory 
infringement means that one who directly contributes to other’s infringement and 
should be liable for his action.67 To establish contributory infringement, the plaintiff 
needs to prove: 1) actual direct infringement occurs; 2) the accused contributory 
tortfeasor has actual or constructive knowledge of the direct infringement; 3) the 
64 See Beckerman, supra note 55. 
65 MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 438 (5th ed. 2010). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
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accused causes or materially contributes to the direct infringement.68 
On the other hand, vicarious liability functions differently. The concept was 
developed from the extension of agency principles by Second Circuit.69 Specifically, 
when one has the power to supervise or control the direct infringement, and 
simultaneously has financial benefits from such action, one is liable for vicarious 
liability, regardless his knowledge of direct infringement.70 To prevail in a vicarious 
suit, plaintiff must show: 1) direct infringement occurs; 2) the accused vicarious 
tortfeasor has the right or power to control or supervise the direct infringement; 3) the 
accused gain direct financial benefit out of the direct infringement.71 
One of the earliest case containing both contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability was Religious Technology Center v. Netcom.72 The Netcom was an online 
service provider that allowed internet news group to make copy of the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work through bulletin board service (BBS) without authorization.73  
The court ruled that Netcom was not liable for vicarious liability since neither 
Netcom nor the BBS received direct financial benefits from the posting action.74 As 
to contributory infringement, the court reasoned that Netcom was liable for such 
liability because of the fact that it had actual knowledge of the direct infringement.75  
The Netcom case is a high profile example of successful applying traditional 
68 NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs., Ltd., 512F.3d 807, at 816 (6th Cir. 2008). 
69 See LEAFFER ,supra note 58, at 445. 
70 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
71 Id. at 1166.  
72 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N. D. Cal. 1995).  
73 Id. at 1238-41. 
74 Id. at 1244-45. 
75 Id. at 1373-76. 
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secondary liability into online environment. Such application, however, does not 
always squarely fit into specific cases. As aforementioned, the evolution of digital 
technologies continuously reshapes the perception of copyright. Within a line of cases, 
the Napster76 was the most famous and influential one.  
 Napster was a P2P file-sharing platform and distributed free software through its 
homepage. Once the software was installed, the user could access Napster system and 
create an account.77 The user then could upload MP3 files in correct format onto the 
platform through his account and enabled others to download.78 Napster platform did 
not keep MP3 files on its centralized indexing system, but merely facilitated the 
distribution.79 
The plaintiff, music industry, admitted that Napster did not committed direct 
infringement due to the technology design. Rather, the plaintiff claimed contributory 
infringement and vicarious liability of Napster. As to contributory infringement, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Napster had actual knowledge of direct infringement by 
its end-users. The internal company e-mails with the list of 12,000 infringing files 
provided by RIAA sufficed as evidence. Moreover, Napster materially contributed to 
the infringing actions because it offered platform and software to users primarily for 
illegal file-sharing. 80 Therefore, Napster actually committed contributory 
infringement. 
76 239 F.3d 1004, (9th Cir. 2001). 
77 239 F.3d, at 1011.  
78 Id. at 1012. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1020. 
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When considering vicarious liability, the court upheld the lower court’s finding 
that Napster had the ability to control infringing actions because it could “block” 
access of users to the system.81 With regard to direct financial benefits, the court 
reasoned that Napster “acted as a ‘draw’ for customers”, because the revenue directly 
related to the frequency of advertisement viewed on the platform.82 
The Napster case is highly influential because it denotes the application of 
traditional secondary liability into online copyright infringement is operable. However, 
technologies never stop the pace. The centralized indexing Napster is merely a 
prototype of P2P file-sharing platform. The next generation of P2P, decentralized 
indexing system, makes the analysis of secondary liability outdated. This time, 
however, the US Supreme Court created a new theory called “inducement liability” 
borrowed from patent law to address the troublesome issue.83 
As aforementioned, the Grokster platform differs significantly from that of 
Napster. Unlike centralized indexing system, the Grokster system created 
decentralized indexing modes, which enabled its users to retain index of files for 
future sharing. 84 The Grokster cannot control its users’ conduct after they install the 
software.85 The inability of control actually circumvented the finding of vicarious 
liability. 
In Ninth Circuit, the court rejected the finding that Grokster had actual or 
81 Id. at 1027. 
82 Id. at 1023. 
83 545 U.S. at 937-38. 
84 Id. at 920. 
85 Id.  
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constructive knowledge of its users’ infringement.86 The court based on the Sony 
doctrine and reasoned that Grokster was capable of substantial non-infringing use.87 
The Supreme Court, however, held the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony doctrine by 
omitting the business mode of Grokster, “One who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third party.”88 
 Judging from the aforementioned, traditional standard of liability can mostly 
applied to online infringement. In general, online secondary liability develops from 
existing case. To summarize, indirect liability consists of the following elements: 1) 
involved in the direct infringement either by control or just as facilitator; 2) 
knowledge of infringement action; 3) derive financial benefits from infringement.
 Technologies keep on evolving, and no one can predict the future. Digital 
technologies, as a double edge weapon, bring about convenience yet threaten the 
foundation of copyright system. Ease of reproduction, widespread distribution, and 
high volume compression remarkably reshape the process of creation and 
dissemination. As a response, lawmakers and judges refer to rules within or beyond 
copyright field to fit digital technologies squarely into current framework. Generally, 
the framework works well when applied to known and mainstream technologies, but 
future breakthroughs still intimidate copyright holders and force copyright law react 
86 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). 
87 Id.  
88 545 U.S. at 919. 
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actively.   
The finding of infringement liability is merely the first step. The second and more 
important step, effective and equitable remedy, is the only way that cures the harm 
suffered by copyright holders and deters illegal actions. Copyright damages, as the 
only monetary relief in copyright law, generally function well as ex post remedy in 
offline practice. When it comes to online environment, however, copyright damages 
gradually become ineffective. 
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Chapter III Response to New Challenges: Copyright Damages in Online 
Environment 
Because intellectual products share the features of public goods, government 
grants limited monopoly to copyright holders so as to rectify market failure. Relying 
on such monopoly, copyright holders should be able to exploit their works and gain 
substantial benefits. The reality, however, sharply departs from the theory. Copyright 
infringement intervene copyright holders’ normal exploitation of works. Under the 
circumstances, copyright remedies become the last resort for copyright holders to 
effective enforce their rights.  
Among varieties of copyright remedies, damages are the only monetary relief 
which recoup copyright holders with financial benefits. Financial losses caused by 
infringements call for damage as ex post solution, because copyright establish on 
utilitarian concept. Copyright infringements are torts in nature and cause financial 
harm to right holder. Hence, copyright damages primarily design to fully compensate 
copyright holders’ actual damages. In theory, the damages should be equivalent to the 
losses of copyright holders. Following the compensation, the next step should be the 
deprivation of unjust enrichment: illegal profits of infringers. The underlying purpose 
is to deter infringement and make infringers unprofitable. Basically, copyright 
damages function well when both compensation and deterrence can be achieved.  
Entering into the digital age, copyright damages confront with advanced 
technologies. As a whole new platform, the online environment challenges the 
operation of damages and questions the effectiveness. Evolutionary digital 
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technologies significantly change the process of creation. Copyright damages, by 
contrast, existed long before the emergence of digital technology and were primarily 
design for offline infringements. Obviously, current damages framework is outmoded. 
For example, the measurement of damages upon actual damages is unreliable and 
difficult. Sometimes it is impossible to make the damages proof beyond speculation. 
Moreover, online infringements rarely generate profits, which cannot meet the 
standard of proof either. To make matter worse, more problems triggered when 
statutory damages applied to online infringements. With gradual updating copyright 
law, it is unpersuasive to remain damages framework alone intact. 
This chapter primarily discusses copyright damages in online environment. In the 
first section, the chapter looks into basic framework of copyright damages: actual 
damages or/and illegal profits and statutory damages. The second section analyzes the 
problems of applying copyright damages to online infringement.  
A. Fundamental Mechanism of Copyright Damages 
1. Actual damages or/and profits 
Generally, Awarding damages upon actual damages or/and illegal profits is the 
earliest and major damages in most jurisdictions. The purpose of awarding damages 
in this category is to compensate copyright holders. The degree of compensation 
determines whether such kind of damage preserves sufficient incentive to copyright 
holders after infringements occur. Sufficient compensation can eliminate financial 
harm by infringement as if no infringements occur. Under the circumstances, 
copyright holders will continue their creation in the future, and the public will benefit 
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from abundant cultural production. On the other hand, granting damages on 
infringer’s profits chiefly deters and punishes unjust enrichment. Disgorgement of 
illegal profits makes infringement meaningless because infringers are not better off 
financially.  
 In theory, a plaintiff in a copyright dispute can recover both his actual damages or 
illegal profits of infringers, or the combination of the two. §504(b) of US Copyright 
Act provides that “the copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages 
suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer 
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing 
the actual damages.”89 When choosing illegal profits, a plaintiff cannot recoup profits 
that have already been converted into the calculation of damages in order to preclude 
double recovery.90 In practice, plaintiff often choose either actual damages or illegal 
profits provides that most plaintiff can prove financial harm and meet the standard of 
proof, while the possibility of gaining the two exists.91 For example, an author 
markets his science fiction but the fiction is pirated by an infringer. Because of the 
infringement, the author can claim either lost sales as actual damages or infringer’s 
sales as profits, given that the infringing copies are equivalent in quality to original 
works. On the contrary, if the infringing copies prove to be inferior in quality and 
diminish the copyright owner’s ability to market the fiction in the future, the profits 
89 17 U.S.C. §504(b).  
90 Id. 
91 See LEAFFER, supra note 65 at 459; See also Abeshouse v. Ultragraohics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467 (2d Cir 
1985)(held that §504(b) was designed to compensate the copyright owner’s actual damages, yet 
recognizing the possibility of cumulative damages in addition to profits). 
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can be awarded as well as lost sales. 
Both actual damages and profits require proof without speculation. Courts in 
copyright dispute are entitled to reject plaintiff’s claim for damages if the proof is 
speculative.92 In some situations, courts might ease the burden of proof. The court in 
Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc.93 held that once the fact of actual damages was 
proved, the degree of harm did not need to be proved to exact certainty.94 Despite the 
easement, actual damages are not easy to prove. Generally, actual damages are based 
on the consideration that whether infringements lead to diminution of market value of 
works, and the degree has a final voice on the amount of awarded damages. When 
infringements occur, the depreciated market value is often measured as actual 
damages to copyright holders. 
 The measurement of decreasing market value requires several considerations. The 
first step is to decide the fair market value: an estimate of market price on a given 
work which depends on what a knowledgeable, willing, and unpressured buyer would 
pay to similar level seller in the market.95 Usually, the fair market value can refer to 
market precedents. However, sometimes there is not existing market for a given work. 
On that condition, courts would measure the fair market value as the amount that a 
plaintiff would reasonably have received or a defendant would reasonably have 
paid.96 After the determination, the subsequent step is to calculate the lost sales as the 
92 See Stevens Linen Assocs., Inc. v. Mastercraft Crop., 656 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1981). 
93 547 F.Supp.400, (N.D. Ill.1983). 
94 Id. at 411. 
95 Fair Market Value, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_market_value. (last updated Apr. 
30, 2012).  
96 Aitken v. Empire Construction, 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).  
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result of infringement. The plaintiff has several methods to prove the actual damages: 
he can establish actual sales during pre-infringement period and use such figure to 
predict lost sales during infringement period. Also, he can use infringers’ sales of 
infringing copies as lost sales. Furthermore, he can compare sales of infringing copies 
with the sales of remaining copyrighted works and use the difference to calculate the 
lost sales.97 The final step is to prove causation. This issue closely relates to lost sales. 
Briefly summarize, the factors that affect the measurement in copyright dispute 
include: (1) the distinction of marketing efforts between plaintiff and defendant; (2) 
different prices of works and pirated copies; (3) varying competition levels between 
plaintiff and defendant; and (4) cost that affecting profits between plaintiff and 
defendant.98 
Because of the complication and difficulty, plaintiffs are more willing to choose 
illegal profits instead of actual damages. §504 (b) provides that: “in establishing the 
infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of infringer’s 
gross revenue.”99 After proving the gross revenue, the burden of proof is shifted to 
defendant of proving deductible costs due to factors other than infringement.100The 
primary purpose of profits recovery is to deprive defendants of unjust enrichment. 
The 1976 US Copyright Act, however, does not specify how to calculate deductible 
costs. Several cases indicated that costs correlate to infringing activities with 
97 Wade R. Keenon, Monetary Recovery Under the Copyright Act: Calculation of Damages, 65 OR. L. 
REV. 809, 812 (1986).  
98 Id. at 817. 
99 17 U.S.C. §504 (b). 
100 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 161 (1976). 
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reasonable and certainty proof can be deductible, such as taxes, royalties to authors, 
overhead and production costs.101 On the other hand, courts would favor plaintiff and 
grant gross revenue as damages when defendant cannot meet the standard of proof.  
Another concern to profits issue is the apportionment. A plaintiff can only claim 
and recover profits attributable to infringement, and is not entitled to profits without 
connection to infringing action. 102  Frequently, several situations complicate the 
process. One situation is that non-infringing factors sometimes contribute to the 
profits of defendants, like the success of an infringing novel is due to effective 
advertising campaign rather than the novel itself. Another one is the collaboration of 
works. For example, the composer of a song incorporated into a popular movie cannot 
claim for the whole profits of that movie. Despite of the difficulty, a defendant can 
effectively reduce available profits to plaintiff by proving such profits are not 
attributable to infringement. One case in point is Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp.103 In this case, the Court approved only twenty percent of profits in the motion 
picture were attributable to plaintiff’s copyrighted play. The Court held that some 
aspects of the success to the motion picture were unrelated to plaintiff’s work, “The 
testimony showed quite clearly that in the creation of profits from the exhibition of a 
motion picture, the talent and popularity of the ‘motion picture stars’ generally 
constitutes the main drawing power of the picture…Here, it appeared that the picture 
101 See e.g., Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826 (9th Cir 1985) (stating that 
advertising cost should be deductible from gross revenue claimed by plaintiff); Kamar Int’l v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating overhead expenses by infringer that contributed to 
infringement cannot be accounted into profits).  
102 17 U.S.C. §504(b). 
103 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
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did not bear the title of the copyrighted play and that it was not presented or 
advertised as having any connection whatever with the play.”104 
2. Statutory damages 
 Statutory damages are another branch in copyright damages system. Although not 
typical, statutory damages gradually become the indispensable component. The 
existence of statutory damages is largely due to the fact that the first kind of copyright 
damages, actual damages or/and profits, is speculative and difficult to prove. The 
history of statutory damages, however, can dates back to eighteen century England 
when copyright disputes were brought in the courts of equity with discretion upon 
awarding. 105  Therefore, statutory damages share some equitable features from 
common law jurisprudence—“high degree of flexibility; regardless of actual proof; 
functions due to the failure of other damage.”106 On the other hand, the framework of 
statutory damages is simple: the awarding of statutory damages substitutes actual 
damages or/and profits at the discretion of courts within a statutory range. The range 
is determined by legislation and courts award specific amount according to the 
culpability of infringement and justice.  
Statutory damages accompanied with US copyright law ever since its first 
enactment. Early in 1790, the first federal copyright act provided that: “…then such 
offender or offenders shall…forfeit and pay the sum of fifty cents for every infringing 
104 Id. at 408. 
105 Kate Cross, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry is Winning Substantial Judgments against 
Individual for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2009-2010). 
106 See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). 
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sheet which shall be found in his or their possession…”107 The 1909 Act actually 
made statutory damages the prominent component in copyright law. Under 1909 Act, 
a plaintiff can choose statutory damages in place of actual damages or/and profits 
when “such damages as…the court shall appear to be just.”108 Meanwhile, infringers 
under such provision should be liable for every infringement activity—“two separate 
infringements of the same copyrighted work result in two separate claims for 
minimum damages.”109 This was the basic framework of statutory damages on 
multiple infringements, which increased both the burden of infringers and the amount 
of damages. As to the statutory range, US Congress set minimum $250 and maximum 
$5,000 to each infringement and granted courts discretion to award damages between 
the two.110 
Despite the simple structure, statutory damages cause some unpleasant results in 
practice. Some courts required the plaintiff to prove actual damages resulting from 
infringement before considering statutory damages.111 Courts also doubt whether 
they had to award actual damages or elect to award statutory damages under 1909 
Act. 112  Moreover, the 1909 Act did not clearly address the issue of innocent 
infringers. Commentators argued that the statutory minimum, $250 per infringed work, 
imposed harsh penalty upon innocent infringers, because innocent infringers did not 
107 See §2 of 1790 Copyright Act (repealed 1947) (note that such statutory damages only applied to 
works that had been previously published). 
108 See §101(b) of 1909 Copyright Act. 
109 Id.  
110 Priscilla Ferch, Note, Statutory damages Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 
490 (1984). 
111 Id. at 491-492. 
112 Id. at 492. 
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aware and had no reason to know that they conduct infringements.113 Such situation 
may deteriorate when innocent infringers conduct multiple infringements without 
awareness.  
Facing with more and more negative comments, the 1976 Act modified the 
statutory damages provision and presented a departure from the framework in 1909 
Act. §504 (c)(1)(B) generally provided that statutory damages are one of the 
copyright damages in 1976 Act.114 The revised version primarily focused on several 
controversial issues in 1909 Act, such as when statutory damages could be awarded; 
how to measure multiple infringement cases115; and how to deal with harshness of 
minimum award to innocent infringers.116 
The first and most prominent modification under 1976 Act was the right of a 
plaintiff to freely elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages or/and profits at 
any time prior to the final judgment.117 It was an absolute right regardless of the 
sufficiency of evidence to actual damages or profits.118 The House Report further 
indicated that a plaintiff might intentionally elect statutory damages even though 
adequate proof existed.119 
The second improvement of new provision was regarding the minimum $250 
award. §504(c) alleviated the harshness to innocent infringers by introducing $100 
113 See Cross, supra note 105, at 1040; also see Ferch, supra note 110, at 497-98.  
114 17 U.S.C. §504 (c)(1)(B). 
115 See H.R. REP, supra note 115, at 162. 
116 Id. at 162-163.  
117 See Leaffer, supra note 65, at 467.  
118 See Ferch, supra note 110, at 504. 
119 See H.R. REP, supra note 115, at 162.  
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minimum award in case innocent infringement was proved. 120  Since innocent 
infringers did not aware or had no reason to know that they infringed copyright, they 
should not become the major target of detergence. Awarding statutory damages 
against innocent infringers should only compensate copyright holders. The minimum 
$100 amount could avoid the negative impact upon innocent infringers and stroke a 
balance between copyright holders and users.  
Awarding statutory damages upon multiple infringements also presented a whole 
new structure. §504 (c) entitled a plaintiff to recover only a single statutory damages 
regardless of how many times a defendant infringed the work or whether the 
infringing acts are separated, simultaneous, or occurred sequentially.121 The amount 
of single award depended on the number of infringements; market value of the work; 
revenue losses by infringement; the culpability of infringement; and the defendant’s 
fault.122  
Because the award focuses on single work, the definition of “work” is 
substantially important in copyright dispute, especially when collaborative works 
become popular with the development of multimedia technologies. For example, a 
CD that contains 24 songs will be deemed as a single work under statutory damages. 
In MP3.com, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that statutory damages should be 
awarded on each sound track in a CD uploaded into infringer’s website because of 
“individual economic value” of every sound track.123 
120 17 U.S.C. §504 (c). 
121 See H.R. Rep. supra note 115, at 162. 
122 See N.A.S. Imp. Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1992). 
123 109 F. Supp. 2d 223, at 224-25. 
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One noteworthy feature of US statutory damages is the varying statutory range. 
The 1909 Act provided that courts could award statutory damages no less than $250 
and no more than $5,000.124 The 1976 Act increased the maximum amount to 
$10,000 against ordinary infringements.125 When it comes to willful infringement, 
the maximum amount could be $50,000. If the infringement is found to be innocents, 
the amount decreased to $100.126 In 1988, US Congress passed the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act and doubled the statutory range so as to comply with the Act.127 
The minimum increased to $500 and the maximum became $20,000.128 Additionally, 
the amount to willful infringements increased to $100,000 and the amount for 
innocent infringements became $200.129 Eleven years later, US Congress changed the 
range again. The Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act 
set out the statutory range from $750 to $30,000 within ordinary infringements.130 
The maximum award to willful infringement increased to $150,000, while remained 
the $200 to innocent infringements.131 The Congress primarily intended to deter and 
punished all future infringers by increasing the penalty.132 
124 §101 (b) of 1909 Act. 
125 17 U.S.C. §504 (c). 
126 Id. 
127 Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement 
Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 
301 (Winter/Spring 2009); see also Pub. L. No. 100-568, 1988 H.R. 4262. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Pub L. No.106-160, 1999 H.R. 3456. 
131 Id. 
132 See H.R. Rep. supra note 115, at 162; see also Shelia B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The 
Problem of Statutory damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 111 (2009) (stating that 
potential infringers are deterred because even the minimum awarding increases the cost of defendants.) 
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B. Copyright Damages in Online Environment: Problems  
Copyright damages are the indispensable instrument to right holders for 
enforcement. As the scope of copyright gradually broadens and new subject matters 
keep on emerging, copyright damages hereby are awarded broader than ever as a 
response. Digital technologies, however, always challenge the framework and 
operation of copyright damages. As the mainstream in copyright remedies, damages 
upon actual damages or/and profits seems outmoded in online environment and are 
used in a relatively low frequency. On the other hand, statutory damages become a 
more attractive choice, but give rise to problems in practice. After eleven years of 
entering into new century, it is time to reexamine that whether the framework and 
rationale of copyright damages still squarely fits into online infringements. 
1. Damages upon actual damages or/and profits  
a) Actual damages 
To claim damages upon actual damages, a plaintiff should prove the losses 
without speculation. This standard does not change in online infringement. Hence, the 
first step is to question whether there are actual damages to copyright holders as a 
result of online infringements. The answer seems self-evident: digital technologies 
enable easy reproduction and widespread distribution online which means several 
clicks and seconds can complete copyright infringement. Moreover, every act of 
infringement causes some harm to the copyright holder because lack of such 
infringement, the infringer would have to purchase the work for use. 133 So, copyright 
133 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual 
Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1652 (1997-98). 
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holders will be recouped by such payment. Equipped with advanced digital 
technologies, the situation deteriorates. Such argument is often used by RIAA when 
they justify their lawsuits against individual end-users on P2P file-sharing platform. 
They posted on their website an array of statistics to illustrate the harm and damages 
due to this kind of infringement: “(1) in the decade since peer-to-peer (p2p) 
file-sharing site Napster emerged in 1999, music sales in the U.S. have dropped 47 
percent, from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion; (2) from 2004 through 2009 alone, 
approximately 30 billion songs were illegally downloaded on file-sharing networks; 
(3) NPD reports that only 37 percent of music acquired by U.S. consumers in 2009 
was paid for.”134 By presenting these horrible astronomical figures, RIAA wish to 
force the public to believe online infringements indeed cause actual damages to them.   
Suffering damages by infringements is not enough to prevail in a copyright 
dispute. To prevail, the plaintiff needs to prove it beyond speculation. This second 
step is determinative to the final awarding. Unfortunately, online copyright 
infringements usually give rise to great difficulty to copyright holders on providing 
certainty proof. As aforementioned, the most difficult mission for a plaintiff is to 
prove the causation link between actual damages and infringements.135 Currently 
some debates still exist on how illegal P2P file-sharing affect legal copyright sales. A 
survey conducted by researchers from Harvard University and University of Kansas 
revealed that illegal downloads through P2P platform only accounts for 0.7 percent of 
reduction on CD sales, and argued that actual damages to record industry may be 
134 For Students Doing Reports, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last updated Nov.2, 2011). 
135 See Keenon, supra note 97, at 816. 
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trivial.136 Even the RIAA admitted on its website that “…calculating lost sales for 
online piracy…is a difficult task…” and cannot provide the public with even an 
approximate figure.137 In Thomas-Rasset138, the head of Sony BMG’s litigation 
department testified that they had no idea of the actual damages they suffered due to 
illegal downloading.139 Without certainty proof of causation link, RIAA could not 
meet the standard of proof and obtained support from courts to the awarding damage 
upon actual damages. Similar situation occurs in two Chinese cases. In Chen 
Xingliang v. Digital Library,140 HaiDian district court rejected the plaintiff’s claim of 
RMB 400,000 as actual damages due to infringement by defendant. The court 
reasoned that the plaintiff did not provide any convincing evidence to the causation 
link between the amount of his actual damages and infringement action.141 Also, the 
court in Zhang ZhiCheng v. 21 ViaNet.Com 142 did not support the plaintiff’s claimed 
amount of actual damages due to his failure to provide certainty proof.143 
Proving actual damages beyond speculation is not the only obstacle for copyright 
holders. The criteria of calculation also call for consideration. Online commercial 
platforms emerged later than offline markets, and major offline merchants do not keen 
on exploring the online markets even if such markets may be more profitable. For 
136 Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Records Sales: An 
Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 36 (2007). 
137 See RIAA, supra note 134.  
138 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
139 See Bangeman, supra note 61. 
140 Beijing HaiDian District People’s Court, 2002 No.5702, Hai Min Chu Zi Di 5707 Hao. 
141 Id.  
142 Beijing First Intermediate Court , Yi Zhong Min Chu Zi No.1217 (2001). 
143 Id.  
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example, RIAA did not enter into digital market for music until 2004.144 Distinctions 
exist between online commercial websites and offline physical markets, like different 
business models and the sales channels. Awarding damage based on offline market 
statistics can either underestimate or over-evaluate online copyright works, resulting 
insufficient compensation or over compensation. Therefore, unambiguous guidance is 
instrumental for courts in calculation. For example, the 2005 China’s Guiding 
Opinions set forth some specific instructions on the calculation of damages to online 
copyright infringement. Article 26 provides that the amount of damages can be 
determined pursuant to the author’s remuneration as prescribed by State in case of 
distributing literary works.145 Furthermore, Article 32 allows courts to increase the 
amount of final damages from three to five times. 146  However, the author’s 
remuneration is prescribed by State before the invention of internet. The distinctive 
features of digital technologies on creation and dissemination had not been taken into 
consideration: the costs of making a copy are far less than producing a physical one; 
and distribution of copies online saves the costs of offline dissemination. Therefore, 
the factors that affect offline markets pricing do not similarly exist in online 
environment. Even if legislators take these factors into consideration, the law still 
cannot keep the pace with progressive technologies and eventually become outmoded. 
Hence, statutory standard of calculation cannot solve problems in practice. 
b) Illegal profits 
144 See RIAA, supra note 134. 
145 See Art.26 of 2005 Opinions. 
146 See Art.32 of 2005 Opinions. 
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Compared with proving actual damages, seeking for infringer’s profits can be 
much easier, at least in theory. Generally, copyright holders in a dispute merely need 
to present the proof of gross revenue by infringements and leave infringers to deduct 
costs. The ease on burden of proof, however, does not aid copyright holders too much. 
Currently, online infringements conducted either by online intermediary like OSPs or 
individual end-users. It is obvious that copyright holders can only claim profits as 
damages from the two groups.  
Online service providers offer varieties of services, many of these services are free 
to online users. For example, Google Map does not charge when one locate favorite 
restaurants. Profits to OSPs usually come through two channels: some OSPs charge 
for their services and users are required to pay subscription fees in order to access 
contents or information. In addition to subscription fees, OSPs gain more financial 
benefits by charging advertisement posted on their websites. Interesting contents 
attract more users and create better opportunities for advertisement. As a result, OSPs 
can charge more for increasing advertisement on their websites. Since digitization 
enables all kind of copyrighted works to be processed and uploaded onto the internet, 
online users choose the network platforms that best fulfill their requirement. Making 
copyrighted works available and free for access become a good business strategy to 
OSPs even if the strategy may be illegal. For example, the court in Napster found the 
platform committed the vicarious liability by reasoning that “it acted as a ‘draw’ for 
consumers”.147 
147 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. 
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However, none of these profits can be reasonably deemed as illegal profits under 
the framework of copyright damages. The subscription fees are legal revenues earned 
by OSPs for offering specific services. As to profits earned by charging advertisement, 
someone may argue it is indirect profits out of infringement. They cited Frank Music 
Corp v. Metro-Golden-Mayer, Inc.148 as an illustration. In Frank, the defendant used 
several copyrighted songs of plaintiff in a show without authorization.149 The court 
held that the plaintiff could recover indirect profits as damages, because the show had 
promotional value to the defendant’s commerce.150 This argument erred because in 
MGM the defendant used copyrighted works in the show for promotion and earned 
profits, whereas OSPs infringe copyright for attraction of more viewers, not earn 
profits through the unauthorized posting.  
On the other hand, individual end-users are not the most suitable target for 
copyright holders to impose this king of damages. Unlike OSPs which provide 
services for users and gain commercial profits, individual end-users primarily pursue 
for non-commercial enjoyment through the use of works. Even committing direct 
infringements, they rarely generate profits from the infringing activities. They do not 
charge others for downloading when they upload files, music, or video online. Under 
the circumstances, copyright holders cannot expect high amount of damages by 
pursuing non-commercial individual end-users. 
2. Statutory damages 
148 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985). 
149 Id. at 510. 
150 Id. at 517. 
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Damages upon actual damages or/and profits prove to be problematic on one hand, 
indicate the necessity and importance of statutory damages on the other hand. As Paul 
Goldstein explains, statutory damages exist “because actual damages are so often 
difficult to prove, only the promise of a statutory award will induce copyright owners 
to invest in and enforce their copyrights and only the threat of a statutory award will 
deter infringers by preventing their unjust enrichment.”151 Usually, the majority of 
online infringements end with the award of statutory damages, because the advantages 
of such damages are obvious in online copyright disputes: the flexibility accelerates 
judicial procedure; the statutory range leaves enough space for judgment to specific 
cases; disregarding the proof on actual damages or/and profits alleviate the burden on 
both parties; etc.  Despite these strengths, however, statutory damages gradually 
present unexpected problems and weaknesses in practice. 
a) Targeting the wrong party 
Began in 2003, the RIAA initiated to file lawsuits against individual end-users 
who illegally distributed copyrighted music through P2P file-sharing platform.152 
According to the RIAA, the legal campaign was to both raise public awareness of 
illegality of unauthorized downloading and distribution, and force online users to 
legally purchase music.153 Eventually, the RIAA filed lawsuits against individual 
end-users in the amount of approximately 35,000 during the five-year period.154 
151 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, Vol.II §14.2, at 14:41 (3rd ed. 2005). 
152 See Moseley, supra note 4, at 315. 
153 Id.  
154 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec.19, 2008, 
at B1. 
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Regardless the ultimate goal, the legal campaign between wealthy plaintiffs and 
poor, non-commercial defendants in the context of digital file-sharing proved to be 
unfair. The groups of individual end-users, ranging from pre-teenagers to college 
students till the elderly, are obviously less wealthy than RIAA and cannot easily 
afford to litigate in federal courts.155 As the result of unbalancing position, most of 
the targeted defendants chose to cease “war” with the RIAA. Among the thousands of 
lawsuits since 2003, only twelve have resulted in litigation.156 
Even if individual end-users are willing to fight with the wealthy RIAA, they 
need to face unpredictable monetary penalty. Given the difficulty in proving actual 
damages and profits, the RIAA tends to choose statutory damages as the best solution. 
One recent well-known case, Thomas-Rasset157, indicated how unreasonable the 
damages could be when RIAA targeted on individual end-users. 
 The Thomas-Rasset became the first P2P file-sharing case that reached a jury 
verdict. Early in 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Jammie Thomas, alleging 
that she illegally downloaded and distributed twenty-four songs through a P2P 
platform: Kazaa.158 The jury found defendant willfully infringed all twenty-four 
songs at issue, and awarded the plaintiff $9,250 per infringed song, which amounts to 
155 Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective Copyright Dispute Resolution, 
110 W. VA. L. REV. 999, 1003 (2007-2008). 
156 Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, BLOGGER, 
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2007/01/how-riaa-litigation-process-works.html(last 
updated Jan.11, 2008)(stating that twelve defendants in the lawsuits have filed motions to dismiss, for 
summary judgment, or made challenges to pretrial discovery). 
157 579 F.Supp.at 1210 . 
158 Id. at 1213-14. 
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$220,000 in total.159 Following the judgment, Thomas filed a motion for retrial based 
upon the unconstitutionality of the excessive awarding.160 She argued that the songs 
were typically available online for one dollar each, and the plaintiff made the price of 
seventy cents per song online. Hence, the actual damages to the plaintiff based on 
twenty-four songs should be $16.80.161In addition, the total damages were a thousand 
times than actual damages even if the court awarded based on the minimum $750 per 
infringed work.162 
 Although the court did not grant a new motion, it addressed the issue that the 
relevant jury instruction was a misstatement of law.163 The court reasoned that “the 
defendant is an individual consumer and a single mother. She is not a business. She 
sought no profit from her acts…Thomas’s conduct was motivated by her desire to 
obtain the copyrighted music for her own use…it would be farce to say that a single 
mother’s acts of using Kazaa are equivalent, for example, to the acts of global 
financial firms illegally infringing copyrights in order to profit…”164 
Moreover, the court calculated the amount of damages to Thomas compared with 
actual damages claimed by her. The court assumed that the twenty-four infringed 
songs were equivalent to approximate three music CDs, which were in the price of 
$54.165 The final awarding, by contrast, was $220,000. Such figure was “more than 
159 Id. at 1227. 
160 Id. at 1212-23. 
161 Id. 
162 Id.. 
163 Id. at 1215. 
164 Id. at 1227. 
165 Id. 
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five hundred times to the costs of buying 24 separate CDs and more than four hundred 
times to the costs of three CDs.”166 After the calculation, the court concluded that 
Thomas simply wanted to access free music as a non-commercial infringer, and her 
actions should not be treated the same as commercial infringers, for their potential 
gains distinguish enormously.167 
 The Thomas-Rasset functions more like a warning to individual end-users. The 
awarding of horrible statutory damages may still be possible in future litigation. 
Despite most defendants eventually settled, litigation end with statutory damages is 
still the major strategy for the RIAA to fight against individual end-users. Although 
the RIAA claimed success of the strategy on increasing public awareness of illegality 
of file-sharing and forcing users back to legal markets, some surveys indicated the 
opposite results by such kind of litigation.168 For example, a study indicated that the 
number of people sharing music on P2P platform increased between 2006 and 
2007.169 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital 
Music Report 2009 also found that “around 95 percent of music tracks are 
downloaded without payment to the artist or the music company that produced 
them.”170 Furthermore, the lawsuits against individual end-users by the RIAA raised 
general resistance from the public, especially among college students.171 In summary, 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See Moseley, supra note 4 at 332. 
169 Id.  
170 Digital Music Report 2009: New Business Models for A Changing Environment, IFPI,  
http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_resources/dmr2009.html (last updated Jan.16,2009). 
171 Kim F. Natividad, Stepping It Up and Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil & Criminal 
Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 469, 477 (2008). 
52 
 
                                                        
pursuing individual end-users by imposing statutory damages is not an effective 
choice for online copyright enforcement. 
b) Abnormal amount of awarding 
Awarding statutory damages is under the discretion of courts within the statutory 
range. Such framework enables flexibility and adjustability in copyright dispute and 
eases the burden to courts on calculation. However, it also gives rise to unexpected, 
results: unprincipled, inconsistent and arbitrary awarding. 172  Several online 
infringement cases, including the aforementioned Thomas-Rasset, fully illustrate the 
anomaly. 
Our first example is the MP3.com173, which can be deemed as predecessor of 
Thomas-Rasset in the context of statutory damages. The trial court held that the 
defendant had willfully infringed copyrights and awarded statutory damages of 
$25,000 per infringed CD.174 Given the fact that there were less than 47,000 CDs at 
issue, the total amount was approximately $118,000,000. 175  This amount was 
unreasonable based on the fact that no actual damages caused by infringement, 
because MP3.com actually did not operate its service prior to trial and had not 
charged fees to its subscribers.176 Moreover, MP3.com merely streamed CDs that its 
users originally purchased, which means copyright holders of sound recordings had 
172 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy In Need of 
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, (Nov. 2009). 
173 92 F. Supp.at 349. 
174 See 2000 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 13293, at *18.  
175 Id.  
176 92 F. Supp. at 351. 
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already obtained some remuneration.177 William Party commented the awarding in 
MP3.com was “hardly necessary as a detergent for a defendant who had not made a 
penny in profits off its use, and where plaintiff had conceded that it could not prove 
any actual damages…”178 
Regardless of the correlation between statutory damages and actual damages, it 
seems the amount of $25,000 is a modest figure because it still falls within the range 
from $750 to $30,000. One recent case, however, has directly linked to the maximum 
end. In Macklin v. Mueck, the defendant operated a poetry website and posted 
plaintiff’s two poems online without authorization.179 The plaintiff subsequently filed 
lawsuit against the defendant and moved for award of maximum statutory damages 
due to willful infringements after the defendants defaulted by not answering the 
complaint.180 The trial court ruled for the plaintiff and awarded $30,000 per infringed 
poem. 181  Obviously, such awarding was plainly punitive and highly excessive 
compared to the need of compensating copyright holders and deterring future 
infringement, because the defendants was unlikely to recoup profits from the 
infringement and the actual damages tends to be modest under the circumstances.182 
Similar disproportional awarding also imposed to the defendant in Los Angeles 
Times, Inc. v. Free Republic.183 The defendant, Free Republic, was a “bulletin board” 
177 Id. at 352. 
178 See 6 Party on Copyright §22:181, at 22-434 (2009). 
179 24 F. 3d 1307, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 1994). 
180 Macklin, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18026, at *3. (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28,2005). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at *5-6. 
183 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2000). 
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website which enabled their members to comment the news articles posted on its 
webpage.184 The plaintiff, Los Angeles Times, contented the defendant facilitated 
copyright infringement by routinely posting entire copyrighted news articles, and 
charged for “archive fees” to members for accessing these works.185 After addressing 
fair use argument proposed by Free Republic, the court rejected and ruled $1 million 
amount of statutory damages to the defendant.186 However, the lawsuit was finally 
settled between LOS Angeles Times and Free Republic. The amount of their 
settlement was $10,000, which constitutes the ration of 1:100 to the statutory 
damages.187 Compared with the two figures, statutory damages sometimes can be 
unreasonable.  
Needless to say, excessive amount of awarding generates chilling effect on the 
development of digital communication technology and online platform. Soon after the 
trial finding of MP3.com, the total amount of statutory damages was $53.4 million.188 
Such awarding forced MP3.com into bankruptcy and its scribers could no longer 
enjoy its online service.189 Under the circumstances, statutory damages in MP3.com 
in fact removed a multifunctional network platform from the internet and shut down 
valuable online service, ignoring the need of non-infringing users and future 
potentiality of that service.190 After all, a new product or service needs time to 
184 Id. at*1. 
185 Id. at* 1-2. 
186 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2000). 
187 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172 at 462. 
188 See 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17907(S.D.N.Y. Nov.14, 2000). 
189 John Carreyrou & Anna Wild Matthews, Vivendi Universal to Buy Mp3.com for $372 Million in 
Cash and Stock, Wall St. L., May 21, 2001, at A3. 
190 See Berg, supra note 127 at 270-71. 
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evaluate the strengths and weaknesses when it enters into market in the early age. 
More importantly, rarely a device is primarily designed for infringing use. However, 
excessive statutory damages potentially eradicate innovation without considering its 
ultimate benefits to society.191 By awarding disproportional statutory damages, court 
actually act as an arbitrator on the issue that whether an emerging technology should 
be remained or removed, which is more suitable for policy makers to determine. 
c) Doubtful statutory range 
Statutory damages are known for its unique feature compared to other kinds of 
damages: the statutory range. In theory, courts can award certain amount within the 
range according to specific cases. Given that the frequent reference to the range in 
copyright dispute, its importance can be seen from two perspectives. For one, it acts 
as an indispensable guidance to judges in the calculation of awarding. For another, it 
becomes a strong signal to all users with respect to their potential liability. However, 
the statutory range does not present rationality when one looks deeply into the history.  
The earliest origin of statutory range can date back to 1895, when advanced 
printing technology made print physical copies more easily. 192  The newspaper 
publishers sometimes unconsciously printed millions of infringed copies with 
subsequent infringement charges against them. As the result, they pushed Congress to 
set forth an upper end of statutory damages to ease their liability.193 So, the 1895 Act 
provided that the amounts from $100 to $5,000 to infringement of copyrighted 
191 Id. at 320.   
192 Id at 277. 
193 Id. 
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photograph; and $250 to $10,000 to painting, drawing, engraving, printing, etc.194 
Although specially designed to certain types of works, it could still be treated as 
prototype of the statutory range. 
The formal statutory range appeared in 1909 Act, which provided that statutory 
damages could be awarded no less than $250 and not more than $5,000 as the courts 
consider just.195 Such figures were the result of the conference during May 1905 till 
Mar. 1906, which primarily dealt with the issue of drafting a new copyright law to be 
presented for next Congress session.196 In the second session from Nov 1-5 of 1905, 
an attorney named Samuel Elder from Massachusetts specializing in copyright law 
proposed his suggestion as to the upper end of statutory damages: “The suggestion I 
made…purely tentative… is that we have some statutes…with regard to public 
service corporations, stream railways, where there is a penalty to be enforced by an 
action in court…finding the road, in case of death, a maximum being established, in 
our state $5,000…”197 It was unclear how persuasive his words to other delegates, yet 
the groups of attendees almost unanimously voted to decide that the upper end of 
statutory damages should be $5,000.198 As to the lower end, The Photographers’ 
Copyright League argued that they at least need $250 to enter into litigation and paid 
for the lawyers.199 Obviously, such amount has no connection to compensation of 
194 See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, Chap. 194, §4965, 28 Stat. 965, as reprinted in Copyright Enactment, 
1783-1906. 
195 See Cross, supra note 105, at 1040. 
196 See Bergs, supra note 127, at 278. 
197 See 2 Legislative History of 1909 Copyright Act, pt. D, at 70-1. 
198 See Berg, supra note 127, at 285.  
199 Id.  
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copyright holders, but merely a basis for initiating a law suit. 
The initial version of statutory range in 1976 Act remained the lower end of $250, 
yet increased the upper to $10,000.200 However, subsequent amendments enhanced 
the amounts and did not bear much link to the actual market value of copyrighted 
works. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 doubled the statutory 
range to $500 and $20,000 respectively.201 The primary goal under such enhancement 
was to stimulate copyright owners to register their works, because copyright owners 
need to register their copyrights to file lawsuits and claimed for statutory damages. 
The possibility of recover doubling damages served as an incentive to copyright 
owners.202 The legislative did not show any sign that the enhancement accompanied 
by the consideration of the actual damages, and such enhancement made statutory 
damages depart from the primary purpose of damages: sufficient compensation and 
effective deterrence.  
Eleven years later, the Congress passed “The Digital Theft Act” which increased 
the range to $750~$30,000.203 This time, Congress justified the enhancement by a 
different argument: “to provide an effective deterrent for copyright infringement 
facilitated by advanced digital technology.” Instead of compensating copyright 
holders, the enhancement was intended to make infringements more expensive to 
infringers.204 Despite the modified one took deterrence into consideration, it still 
200 17 U.S.C. §504(c) (2) (Jan.1978). 
201 See Pub L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.2853 (1988). 
202 See S. REP. No. 100-352, at 46-47.  
203 See Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999). 
204 See H.R. REP. No. 106-216, at 3 (1999). 
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disregarded the perspective of compensation to copyright holders.  
Concluding from aforementioned, the statutory range did not relate to the market 
value of copyrighted works and the compensation to copyright holders, but to other 
considerations: initiating a lawsuit; serving an incentive to register; and deterring 
infringements. Basically, effective copyright damages should not omit sufficient 
compensation to copyright holders in order to preserve sufficient incentive for future 
creation. Sufficient compensation requires the damages fully reflect actual damages 
according to the fair market value of works. Such range, however, did not meet the 
requirement. Given that the different nature between online websites and offline 
markets, the range may weaken the effect of compensation to copyright holders. So, 
statutory range generated from considerations without regard to compensating 
requirement is unpersuasive and inefficient. 
According to all the above mentioned, applying copyright damages to online 
infringements presents problematic and ineffective results. It is often difficult for a 
plaintiff to prove their actual damages on one hand, and unlikely to recoup 
compensation from online infringer’s profits on the other hand. The statutory damages, 
though flexible and costless to implement, tends to be “grossly excessive, 
unprincipled, and arbitrary.”205 The situation becomes even worse when certain 
plaintiff, like the RIAA, targets on individual end-users with disproportional awarding. 
By targeting wrong groups, the RIAA raises negative comments from the public and 
potentially lost its supporters. Moreover, the statutory range did not take 
205 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172, at 441.  
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compensating requirement into consideration, which can eventually leads to 
inefficient enforcement.  
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Chapter IV Rethinking the Foundation of Copyright Remedy: Property rules & 
Liability rules  
Copyright is indispensable component of intellectual property. As distinctive 
property exploited by right holders, copyright as well as other intellectual property 
naturally relates to traditional perception of physical property. For one, copyright have 
static value, which means right holders can exploit copyrighted works for profits after 
creation. For another, copyright share dynamic feature as physical property because 
lots of derivative works that seek for future benefits are based on original creation. 
Under the circumstances, property rules traditionally possess dominant position in the 
development of copyright law. Specially, copyright holders enjoy highly exclusive 
rights to exclude others from exploiting the works. Once infringements occur, right 
holders can enforce their rights to the extreme by requiring courts to impose 
injunction over infringers. Such kind of remedy makes copyright holders enforce their 
rights similar to land owners with regard to their lands.  
Despite the dominance of property rules, exception still exists in copyright law. 
Various kinds of compulsory licenses indicate the existence of liability rules. Unlike 
property rules, liability rules act more like complements in copyright law. Generally, 
they function better than property rules when personal transaction and enforcement in 
copyright become expensive and inconvenient. Since liability rules negate voluntary 
transaction to some extents and usually do not reflect accurate value, copyright 
holders usually do not prefer to such rules. Copyright users, to the contrary, are 
willing to support such rules which create more convenience to them. Basically, 
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liability rules in copyright law mainly design to facilitate transaction due to market 
failure, and offer ex post compensation. Copyright damages, in theory, are the best 
examples for ex post compensation which function similar to compensatory damages 
in contracts. 
Remedies in copyright law are critically important to each right holder for 
effective enforcement. Whether to impose injunction or award damages depends on 
the option between property rules and liability rules. If copyright holders can easily 
protect their works like land owners in real world, then injunction should be the better 
choice because this kind of remedy exercises absolute exclusion and fulfills copyright 
value greater than damages.  
However, the situation significantly changes when it comes to online 
environment. The evolving landscape indicates distinctive features between online 
copyright infringement and offline tort of physical property. Unlike infringements of 
physical property, online “taken” action is costless and time-saving. The progressive, 
advanced digital technologies facilitate reproduction and distribution. One can 
infringe copyright easily in his home, which is distinguished from steal of a car. 
Moreover, high volume compression enhances the value potentially taken by 
copyright infringers. Since injunctions are too absolute to clearly distinguish 
infringements from non-infringing use and thus preclude all valuable online 
exploitation when imposed, imposing injunction upon online infringement gradually 
becomes less effective.  Under the circumstances, awarding damages gradually play 
a more important role in online copyright remedy. Nevertheless, current copyright 
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damages over online copyright infringements prove to be problematic and ineffective, 
especially the statutory damages. Some awarding of statutory damages in case law 
reflects certain degree of confusion on the nature of damages.206 Should copyright 
damages remain intact in online environment? A negative answer is highly possible.  
This chapter analyzes property rules, liability rules and their connection to 
copyright damages as well as the application to online infringements. The first section 
briefly describes property rules, liability rules and remedies. This description serves 
as a premise to the following analysis. In the second section, this chapter looks into 
the interaction between property rules and copyright. The third section analyzes the 
application of traditional property rules into online environment. In summary, the 
analysis in this chapter acts as guidance to possible solutions upon current 
problematic, ineffective online copyright damages.  
A. Property rules, Liability rules and Remedy 
 Property rights are exclusive rights that the holder of certain property can control, 
use, and recoup benefits from the exploitation. The right holder can exclude anyone 
from exploiting the property without permission. 207  Such exclusion disregard 
whether social benefits are enhanced by unauthorized use.208 For example, an owner 
has property rights to a house. A buyer who wishes to buy the house needs to 
negotiate with the owner to get the entitlement, and the value of the house will be 
increased after the transaction because the house is more worthy to the buyer. Just as 
206 See Thomas-Rasset, 579 F.Supp.at 1210; also see MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. at 349.  
207 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 29 (1987). 
208 Id.  
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Calabresi and Melamed mentioned: “…the entitlement protected by property rules 
that someone wishes to remove the entitlement from the holder must buy from him in 
a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the 
seller…”209 Since property right grant substantial power for owner to exclude others, 
rarely can a third party intervene the owner’s exploitation. Property rights in fact 
create the least extent of external intervention: The owner decides the value and 
marketing of a given property.210 Although each buyer is able to set forth how much 
the property is worthy to him, the seller can simply reject if both parties do not reach 
satisfactory agreement.211 
 The liability rules, to the contrary, create rights that do not generate excludable 
power on right holders, but granting them a chance to claim damages for certain 
injury caused by tortfeasors.212 For example, one injured in a car accident cannot 
prevent a car from striking him down before the accident, but can claim damages 
from the driver according to the extent of harm after the accident. Under the 
circumstances, liability rules operate only when harmful actions occur, and the injured 
do not have right to block certain actions. In other word, a person can remove certain 
entitlement from the initial owner by simply paying an objective price determined by 
a third party, like the court.213 The price usually determined based on the hypothesis 
that how much an initial holder would have sold it. The holder, by contrast, complains 
209 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1971-1972). 
210 Id.  
211 Id.  
212 See Landes & Poser, supra note 207, at 30.  
213 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 209, at 1092. 
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that he would have demanded for a higher price than the hypothetical one.214 
Distinguished from property rights which exclude most external intervention, liability 
rules actually allow the third party intervention.  
One regular issue of remedies is whether it is preferable to protect certain 
entitlements by means of property rules or liability rules. In general, a property owner 
prefers to injunction rather than damages because injunction under property rules 
maximizes the value of a given property. An injunction can impose exclusive effect 
over the tortfeasor, which cannot be achieved by damages.215 Such exclusive effect 
by injunction is highly important to the property owner. It forces all persons who 
interests in a given property back to the private voluntary transaction, which is under 
the control of property owner.216 To the contrary, the damage-only remedy becomes a 
weaker protection and equivalent to ex post forced licensing if the owner is denied 
injunctions. 217  Because the dynamic nature of property demands for future 
investment and creation on existing property, lack of exclusive control would likely 
weaken such incentives to a property owner. Thus, the owner may be less inclined to 
produce and invest more on his property.  
Damages remedy, on the other hand, aims at compensating losses after the 
transferring of certain entitlement. Based on aforementioned, the taker of certain 
property often value more than the owner, and is much likely to input more 
214 Id.  
215 Jake Phillips, eBay’s Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Property Rules Give Way to Liability 
Rules, 24 BERKELEY. TECH. L. J. 405, 406 (2009). 
216 Id. at 413. 
217 Id. at 409. 
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investment. From societal utility-maximizing perspective, such transferring creates 
higher social welfare than remain the entitlement intact. A case in point is the creation 
of derivative works in copyright. Basically, strong copyright protection by injunction 
promotes innovation. However, excessively broad protection actually leads to 
counterproductive effects upon copyright creation, because the public rely on original 
works to create derivative works. According to Judge Pierre Leval, exclusive effects 
by certain injunction in creative works would prevent references to prior works or the 
building innovative ideas out of older one and “would strangle the creative 
process.”218 
The choice between injunction (property rules) and damages (liability rules) 
usually depends on given situation. Based on Calabresi and Melamed’s framework, 
transaction costs play a determinative role on whether it is more effective to set the 
price by private transaction or by a third party.219 Transaction costs often determine 
whether parties will reach an efficient outcome through bargaining over certain 
property.220 Generally, high transaction costs can be prohibitively expensive which 
produce barriers for parties to eventually reach an agreement on market. Under the 
circumstances, courts should depend on liability rules and award damages so as to 
ensure an efficient outcome in the absence of consensual bargaining. 221  Low 
transaction costs, on the other hand, make bargaining process simple and costless, 
which enable parties to complete satisfactory transaction on market. 
218 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990). 
219 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 209, at 1106. 
220 R.H. Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.1, 15-19 (1960). 
221 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 209, at 1119.  
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Transaction costs usually contain two considerations: 1) the expenses and barriers 
to negotiate with multiple parties and 2) strategic behaviors engaged by property 
owners.222 The first consideration can be easily understood: transaction costs would 
be low when only two parties can readily arrange time and place for negotiation. The 
more parties involved, the more negotiations need to conduct. Thus increase expenses 
and barriers for sellers and buyers to reach satisfactory agreement. Basically, liability 
rules would prevail over property rules when multiple parties engaged in transaction. 
The second consideration, strategic behaviors, is more often used for arguments 
on the advantages of liability rules. Once property owner is granted property-like 
protection on certain entitlement, he can exercise this power to refuse any access in 
order to artificially inflate the price. Thus, from the standpoint of transaction, both 
parties lose the opportunity to enlarge the value of the entitlement. From the 
perspective of social welfare, the failure of transaction deprives the public of 
opportunities to enjoy more benefits. Under the circumstances, applying liability rules 
can effectuate transaction and maximize social value.  
B. Property & Copyright 
1. Dominance of property in copyright 
Law and economics communities have long been considering whether it is 
preferable to protect copyright by means of property rules or liability rules.223 
Copyright is indispensable component of intellectual property and the term, 
222 Mark A. Lemley &Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability rules Govern Information? 85TEX. 
L. REV. 783, 786 (2007). 
223 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 133, at 1613. 
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“intellectual property”, seems to denote that copyright closely connect to property 
rules.224 The vogue to define copyright, as one part of intellectual property, belongs 
to another species of physical property gradually place property rules in dominant 
position in copyright.  
Transaction costs are one of the considerations which incline to property rules in 
copyright. The dominance of property rules lies in the following advantages: (1) only 
two parties involving in transaction that are easy to identify; (2) transaction costs are 
low; and (3) each copyrighted work share distinguished feature and market in 
different business environments. The pricing decision should be left to both parties in 
transaction rather than the third party so as to avoid expensive, time-consuming and 
often inaccurate process. 225 The representative of liability rules in copyright, 
compulsory license that operated under some statutory rate, is less efficient than 
property rules.226 The compulsory license scheme is primarily designed to specific 
situation when transaction costs are high so that efficient transfer of copyright 
resource cannot be available. However, such scheme omits market value and may 
become fallacious premise for copyright damages. 
In addition to the consideration of transaction costs, some courts and 
commentators tend to agree the idea that copyright holders should be entitled to 
capture full social value out of their exploitation, fearing that free riding by copyright 
infringements would weaken the incentive for future copyright creation. Their 
224 Id. at 1614.      
225 Id., at 1615. 
226 Id.  
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perception indicated the conclusion that the growth of property rhetoric in copyright is 
not closely identified with general concept of common law property, but with the very 
standpoint that property owner should internalize or recoup all social value of said 
property.227 Such conclusion originates from the essence of private ownership as 
solution to “tragedy of commons”.228 The “tragedy of commons” denotes the danger 
of negative externality to property. For example, a non-private grass land would be 
over grazed by herds because each shepherd does not care the sustainability of the 
grass land, eventually make the grass land desolate. Hence, granting private property 
right over certain entitlement is the solution to reduce negative externality.  
Among a variety of negative externalities, free riding is the major problem 
emphasized by scholars. Free riding refers to a person who obtains benefits from 
someone else’s investment, which undermine the externality-reducing function and 
goals of property system.229 The danger lies in that property owner would not further 
invest sufficient resources in his property if others can easily free ride on the 
investment. In copyright, free riding usually occurs. Image individual end-users freely 
download music made by record company without paying a dime; college students 
upload latest movie in campus network for sharing without permission; P2P 
file-sharing platform facilitate distribution of copyrighted works without authorization; 
etc.  
In an effort to eliminate free riding, copyright law had been gradually modified to 
227 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1037 
(2005). 
228 Garrett Hardin, the Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
229 See Lemley, supra note 227, at 1040. 
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impose more property-like protection over works. Terms of protection have been 
extended; the scope of rights has been expanded; the number of copyrightable works 
increases and it is easy to qualify for copyright protection; penalties become 
harsher. 230  In addition to legislation, courts sometimes awards damages with 
property-like feature. The result of such awarding, nevertheless, causes 
counterproductive impact upon copyright enforcement. The Thomas 231  and 
MP3.com232 are exemplary cases which indicate the grossly excessive awarding of 
statutory damages in online copyright infringement. Reprehensibility in both cases 
cannot be said high because proof of willfulness was weak. Also, none of the 
defendants were repeated infringers for which enhanced statutory damages were 
targeted. The ratio of awarded statutory damages to actual damages was also 
disproportional.233 
2. Liability rules: exceptions to copyright 
 In general, liability rules exist as statutory exceptions in copyright law. For 
example, §115 provide compulsory licensing of musical compositions for use in 
phonorecord.234 § 118 provide compulsory licensing of works for use by public 
broadcasting entities. 235  §119 provide compulsory licensing for satellite 
retransmission.236 All these statutory exceptions usually targets on potential barrier in 
230 Id. at 1044. 
231 579 F. Supp. at 1210. 
232 92 F. Supp. at 349. 
233 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172 at 480. 
234 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
235 17 U.S.C. § 118. 
236 17 U.S.C. §119. 
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private transaction which increase transaction costs. Under these exceptional 
circumstances, the third-party price decision can reduce cost and remove barrier more 
efficient than personal pricing decision. 
 Theoretically, copyright transaction usually involves a relatively small number of 
parties, sometimes merely the buyer and the seller. Such situation reduces barriers and 
expenses in negotiation and facilitates price decision, eventually leads to more 
optimal outcomes through successful transaction. From comparative perspective, 
property rules operate more efficient than liability rules under low transaction costs. 
Liability rules, to the contrary, often promote efficiency when it is relatively easy to 
determine the price of a given transaction by reference to an objective market 
value.237 Under the circumstances, courts can promote efficiency if accurately assess 
the harm due to infringements imposed upon right holders and apply liability rules 
that allow the infringing use so long as damages are equivalent to the actual harm.  
 Contracts cases provide high profile examples. Often courts can easily calculate 
approximate damages as compensation to injured party based on the objective market 
value. The underlying purpose is to encourage the efficiency of breach: such 
compensatory damages both remedy the injured party and transfer the entitlement for 
more valuable use, because the breaching generates a substitute transaction with 
someone who values the entitlement more. 238  When considering copyright, 
nevertheless, the case is different. The actual damages by unauthorized use of 
237 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 209, at 1106-08. 
238 Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, COLUM. L. REV. 2655, at 
2665 (1994). 
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copyrighted works often lead to inherent confusion. Un-copyrightable idea and 
copyrightable expression usually merge together, and the line is not clear enough for 
even judges to differentiate. The subjective merging situation denies the reference to 
objective market, and courts have difficulty in calculating equivalent damages used 
for promoting efficiency. So long as the injured party is not sufficiently compensated, 
the anticipated value of transferring the entitlement is greatly reduced.  
 As to remedy issue, the preference for property rules by courts makes liability 
rules less popular in litigation. Injunction, on behalf of property rules, often granted as 
a matter of course upon proof of copyright infringements.239 The benefit of granting 
injunction is to force both parties in litigation back to private negotiation in order for 
optimal outcomes. Damages-only remedy, as hallmark of liability rules, is equivalent 
to third-party price decision. According to Professor Merges, damage remedy 
functions as “ceiling on the amount the right holder can collect”.240 Under the 
circumstances, if courts set the ceiling lower than expected level, the economic 
incentives of copyright holders will be undermined. The best way to avoid such 
situation is “set the price equal to the holder’s valuation in separate case, which is of 
course more efficiently accomplished by a property rules.” 241  Accordingly, the 
holders of copyright protected by property rules often have more incentives than those 
in liability rules to invest valuable creation. In summary, either to facilitate private 
transaction or to stimulate the motivation of creation, liability rules are less preferable 
239 17 U.S.C. §107. 
240 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (1996).  
241 Id.  
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than property rules in copyright. 
3. Rethinking property in copyright 
 Although the dominance of property rules in copyright has long been a tradition, 
the application into remedy issue gives rise to problematic and ineffective results. The 
assumption that copyright holders should be entitled to capture all social value out of 
their works stimulates excessive awarding of damages. Actually, none of economics 
literature denotes that producers can capture the full social value of their products, or 
owners of certain property can internalize all positive externalities.242 From free 
market perspective, producers are entitled to earn sufficient return to cover their costs, 
including reasonable profits. 243 So long as the price covers marginal costs the 
producers would continue their production. Fully internalizing positive externalities, 
on the other hand, will leads to a monopoly world. Monopoly increases returns to 
producers and brings them closer to all social value, and eventually overwhelm 
competition in free market. 244  Fearing the danger of monopoly, people design 
antitrust law to make sure positive externalities are not fully captured by producers, 
but left to increase social welfare.245 
 Property law never directly recognizes the idea that owners are entitled to capture 
all positive externalities. Imagine one cultivates scent flowers in his front yard, he 
cannot charge from passengers-by by claiming they smell the good from his flowers. 
Property law does not give him such right to expand the control of positive 
242 See Lemley, supra note 227, at 1046. 
243 Id. 
244 Id . at 1048. 
245 Id. 
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externalities. Even if the passengers-by seems to free ride the benefits out of scent 
flowers, the idea to eliminate such kind of free riding is irrational. After all, positive 
externalities exist everywhere and producers should not demand to fully internalize 
them. If free riding means merely acquiring benefits from another’s investment, the 
law should not prohibit such action so long as producers can earn sufficient returns 
and reasonable profits that cover their marginal costs.246 In summary, unless effective 
exploit certain property demand high returns which is equivalent to the full positive 
externalities, complete internalization must be denied.  
 The fear and enmity to free riding among property owners largely come from the 
features of physical property. Firstly, rivalrous uses by multiple parties cause “tragedy 
of commons” to a given property. Secondly, physical property is finite and can be 
depleted eventually. The more exploitation, the faster it will be depleted. Copyright, 
however, do not share the same features as physical property. Consumption of 
intangible goods is nonrivalrous, which means the use of an idea does not impose any 
costs on another user and one cannot easily exclude others.247 The uses by everyone 
on intangible assets do not preclude others from using the asset or lead to depletion. 
Therefore, the “tragedy of commons” on physical property disappears when 
intangible property is taken into consideration. Under the circumstances, the concern 
and danger of free riding in copyright are substantially weakened.  
 Free riding on intangible goods occur ubiquitously. The use of certain expressions 
in copyright does no harm to creators. To the contrary, such use is one of the goals 
246 Id. at 1049. 
247 Mark A. Lemley, What is Different about Intellectual Property? 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2005). 
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that copyright law intends to promote: copyright protection is essentially designed to 
maximize societal welfare by promoting literary and artistic progress as well as enrich 
the public. The only concern under copyright law is that a creator may risk the danger 
of insufficient compensation to cover their costs, and deprive him of incentives for 
creation. Since copyright creations always build on pre-exiting works, creators should 
neither internalize the full value nor seek to monopolize his products in order to leave 
enough positive externalities for future creation. 
 Another difference between copyright and physical property is the boundary of 
rights. In general, both physical and legal boundaries of physical property are clear. 
One can figure out the boundary of a house by looking at fences that surround it, and 
the owner can fully understand what kind of rights he can exercise over his house by 
referring to property law. Under the circumstances, transaction between potential 
buyers and the house owner is effective because both parties know clearly what they 
can obtain from the transaction. Protection of this house can also be easy and efficient 
because all rights are listed under black-letter law. In summary, a clear boundary of 
rights creates certainty to both private transaction and legal protection.  
 Considering copyright, however, the situation is significantly different. Intangible 
creations do not have physical boundary that can be clearly defined. It is impossible to 
locate “fences” to certain intangible goods like that in real property. A user may know 
a particular work is copyrighted, but he may have no idea of what kind of use is legal 
or not. He may comply with the reproduction right while violating public performance 
right due to his misunderstanding. Moreover, the highly theoretical concept of fair use 
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doctrine, idea/dichotomy and merger doctrine greatly blur the boundary of legal 
protection. Most people cannot confidently tell the difference and figure out the 
boundary except for judges and scholars. Under the circumstances, the boundary of 
rights either makes enforcement of copyright insufficient to right holders, or overly 
expands the protection which disproportionately internalizes positive externalities. 
 Based on the above analysis, copyright actually does not share so much analogy 
and relevance to the physical property even though copyright traditionally fall within 
the scope of property. The major concern in property, free riding, does not justify the 
overly expanded protection of copyright. For one, free riding under copyright 
promotes underlying goal of copyright law. For another, the improper introduction of 
such idea into online copyright damages leads to problematic and ineffective results. 
Moreover, the uncertain boundary of rights worsens copyright enforcement to a great 
extent. Obviously, copyright damages should not operate under the misunderstanding 
of property rules.  
C. New landscape emerges: online environment 
 Digital technologies not only create new challenges to copyright law, but question 
the application and reasonability of property rules for online copyright enforcement. 
The landscape of creation and dissemination of copyrighted works has significantly 
evolved due to revolutionary technological progress.248 Duplicating an electronic 
copy online saves time with the aid of personal computers. Such updating, compared 
to photocopy machine, efficiently reduces marginal costs of mass production so that 
248 See supra contents in Chapter II. 
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increases potential profits to copyright holders by lowering their costs. On the other 
hand, a user with personal computer can easily upload a perfect and high quality copy 
of works onto internet for sharing. Such practice means unauthorized distribution 
online becomes easier than disseminating pirated copies in an offline flea-market 
because of the efficiency, quality and low costs by digital technologies.  
The underlying rationale of property-like remedy in copyright is to effectively 
deter infringers so as to force them back to private transaction, eventually make the 
price close to the fair market value. Under the circumstances, both copyright holders 
and users should satisfy with the result on private negotiation, because they obtain 
what they need and the negotiation engenders the least costs.  
When it comes to online environment, the underlying goal remains the same. In 
general, most copyright holders regard their works valuable personal property online 
and seek to exclude other online users from accessing or exploiting their works 
without authorization. In addition to explore online market and establish new business 
models, they also resort to copyright law to enforce their digital copyright. All their 
actions focus on eliminating any sort of free riding facilitated by advanced 
technologies and internalizing all positive externalities, just as they do in offline 
world. Such actions, however, depart from the basic concept of property rules and 
cause problematic situations to online copyright enforcement. 
 These problematic situations are largely due to the misunderstanding of property 
rules, and the results often give rise to counterproductive effects. To illustrate, 
consider the issue of injunction imposed on online search engines. As is known to all, 
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search engines depend on special software to categorize websites and download 
specific web-pages for indexing. When a search engine is charged for engaging 
copyright infringements by making given copies, it is difficult to enjoin it from 
making given infringing copies while simultaneously allowing it to make 
non-infringing ones.249 Such requirement will leads to shutdown of that search 
engine. Eventually, such property-like remedy negates legal users’ accessibility and 
reduces efficiency by the search engine.  
 A case in point is Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.250 Perfect 10 owned copyrights on 
pornographic photos and sued Google for copyright infringement because some of the 
websites indexed by Google contained unauthorized copies of its photos, and Google 
also displayed some low-resolution “thumbnail” photos which infringed Perfect 10’s 
copyright.251 The district court held that the website caching and linking to infringing 
websites were not copyright infringement considering the basic nature of search 
engine,252 but concluded that the “thumbnail” photos in Google infringed copyright 
because these copies might interfere with the sales of low-resolution photos for 
downloading to cell phones.253 
 The problem to Google was that it was nearly impossible to stop only the display 
of infringed “thumbnails” photos without interfering other legal operation of search 
engine. From the standpoint of Perfect 10, an injunction that prevented all photos by 
249 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 222, at 800. 
250 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
251 Id. at 832-34. 
252 Id. at 844. 
253 Id. at 849. 
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Perfect 10 in Google was more preferable and effective to make sure no infringement 
occurred anymore. As a matter of fact, reliable methods that Google could comply 
with such an injunction would either be to shut down the photos search image 
altogether, which blocked enormous amount of non-infringing content for access; or 
to check specific content for infringement by hand, which slowed down the process 
significantly and increased expenses to Google.254 Realizing the difficulty to Google, 
the court imposed a preliminary injunction upon Google. 255  Instead of totally 
enjoining Google, the court offered a highly flexible standard which was similar to the 
DMCA “notice and takedown” provision.256 In adopting such limited injunction, the 
court departed from the absolute exclusion under property rules and accepted certain 
degree of free riding online in order to maintain normal operation of the search 
engine.  
 In addition to search engines, P2P file-sharing platforms offer a high profile 
example. Generally, an injunction upon P2P platforms covers non-infringing materials 
as well as infringing ones and forces those platforms to shut down. In the context of 
Napster257, such an injunction did not give rise to many losses to online users because 
nearly 99% of uploading materials were infringing.258 When it comes to Grokster, 
however, the injunction made nearly 10-30% non-infringing materials unavailable 
online.259 Obviously, the enforcement by injunctions online often results in shutting 
254 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 222, at 801. 
255 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. at 851. 
256 Perfect 10, No. CV 04-9484AHM (C.D. Cal May 8, 2006). 
257 Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004. 
258 Id. at 1021. 
259 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 1158. 
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down of P2P file-sharing platform and depriving online users of fair opportunities to 
access to non-infringing materials. The decision by Supreme Court on Grokster 
actually denoted inappropriate understanding of property rules in online environment.  
 Based on aforementioned, one can conclude that property-like remedy, injunction 
or current copyright damages, function well when the scopes of property rights are 
well defined. In the context of physical property, this does not add up to difficulty and 
problems, because one can easily differentiate exact scope of certain physical property 
and the impact of such remedy usually does not exceed the scope. However, copyright 
are ill-defined, not only because one cannot accurately know whether a work is 
protected but because the statutes sometimes are ambiguous so that one cannot figure 
out whether certain aspect of a work is protected.260 Moreover, it is difficult to judge 
whether a particular use is infringing or not, and imposing such remedy will lead to 
unreasonable intervention to normal use. 
 Internalizing all positive externalities online without distinguishing the nature 
will exclude both infringing and non-infringing use of works, and deprives online 
users of potential opportunities for fair use or transformative enhancement. Thus 
narrows the public domain for future creation. Not all free riding online are 
counterproductive. Unauthorized use of protected works, though sometimes infringed 
copyright, often leads to the creation of more valuable derivative works. From the 
perspective of social welfare, permitting certain degree of unauthorized use in 
exchange of more broaden public domain is better than monopolizing intellectual 
260 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 222, at 794. 
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product by individuals so long as the creators still have incentives to invest their 
production. Obviously, such incentives do not demand all positive externalities as 
compensation. Therefore, the idea of internalizing all positive externalities is no 
longer appropriate to the enforcement of online copyright. 
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Chapter V We should be on the right track: Suggestions and Solutions 
Current copyright damages to online infringements prove to be problematic and 
ineffective. As Chapter III indicates, damages upon actual damages or/and profits 
cause difficulty for both parties to implement in litigation, and the calculation and 
apportionment cause uncertainty and speculation. Statutory damages, on the other 
hand, mainly designs to ease the difficulty for courts in judgment. However, frequent 
use of such damages leads to unexpected results: excessive amount of awarding, 
targeting wrong people, and unreasonable statutory range. The endeavor by copyright 
holders to enforcement do not raise much public awareness of online copyright 
protection among social groups, but trigger negative comments to their enforcement 
strategies. Moreover, such strategies denote that copyright holders still seek for 
eliminating all free riding and try to internalize all positive externalities. Under the 
circumstances, the implementation of statutory damages seems gradually contain the 
feature of property-like remedy even though such damages should normally operate 
under liability rules in theory. 
According to the analysis in last chapter, property rules are generally more likely 
to promote efficiency then liability rules when implemented by copyright holders for 
enforcement. It seems that imposing injunctions over infringements should be the 
most approximate choice with regard to promoting effeciency. Such kind of remedy, 
to the contrary, depart from the correct idea that property owner should not internalize 
all positive externalities. When considering online environment, injunctive remedy 
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become more problematic.261 Compared with injunctions, damages can preclude such 
problems because damages primarily focus on sufficient compensation to injured 
copyright holders. So long as the compensation is sufficient to cover the losses, 
copyright holders should not claim for additional benefits. Therefore, part of positive 
externalities will be freely left to use and the public domain will be expanded.  
 Since copyright damages can potentially become more efficient then injunctions 
to online infringements, developing an effective damages model is indispensable. 
Sufficient compensation is not the only perspective that effective copyright damages 
should take into consideration. In theory, copyright law aims at maximizing social 
welfare by promoting cultural production, increasing valuable creation and enriching 
public available resources. Therefore, an efficient model of copyright damages should 
cover all the underlying considerations from social perspective as well as individual 
perspective. For one, lack of sufficient compensation deter potential authors from 
creating. So, the number of cultural production will be less than the optimal 
requirement.262 As a result, the public domain will be narrower and less works can be 
used as “building blocks” for future creation. For another, overcompensation to 
copyright holders is almost equivalent to allowing they monopolize all social value, 
leading depletion of the public domain. The critical point of damages model lies in the 
balance of interests between each online player.  
This chapter explores the efficient model of copyright damages to online 
copyright infringements, and uses such model as general principle to specific 
261 See supra contents in Chapter. IV. 
262 See Phillips, supra note 215, at 408. 
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problems. The first section discusses the basic framework of efficient copyright 
damages. This discussion serves as a premise to the following analysis. In the second 
section, this chapter specifically discusses solutions to given problems analyzed in 
former chapters. The solutions largely focus on statutory damages which cause major 
problems and debate as well as looking into solution of damages upon actual damages 
or/and illegal profits.  
A. What is efficient copyright damages model? 
 How do effective copyright damages work? Basically, two perspectives need to 
be considered: incentives and deterrence. Incentives primarily relate to the action and 
choice of copyright holders. In theory, ideal incentives can trigger copyright holders 
to create valuable works and invest more on future creation. As a result, the society is 
able to benefit from the cultural progress. Insufficient incentives, equivalent to 
ineffective copyright protection, usually force the number of works far from the 
optimal requirement. Since other free riders will take advantages of efforts by creators 
and publishers, copyright holders have to cease their cultural production because they 
cannot recoup their investment from exploitation. However, insufficient incentives do 
not follow that high level of incentives is the best choice. High level of incentives 
often demands strong protection of copyright, which otherwise deter the creation of 
derivative works that build upon preexisting works.263  
 At the same time, deterrence chiefly targets on the actions and choices of free 
riders: copyright infringers. Generally, effective deterrence can control the frequency 
263 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 133, at 1606.  
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and harm of infringements, and thus preserve benefits of creation to copyright holders. 
Copyright holders usually treat these benefits as directive incentives, and their actions 
will be affected by benefits. They will continue their creation If the benefits satisfy 
them. Otherwise they would rather be free riders than keep on creating. From the 
standpoint of infringers, their actions and choices depend on whether their profits 
affected by deterrence. They often continue infringements if they perceive the 
deterrence is slight compared to their available profits. To the contrary, infringers 
generally are willing to stop infringements if deterrence adds up the costs to a point 
that legal transaction can be more profitable.  
1. Preserving the incentives 
 Copyright holders seek to maximize their benefits by creating valuable works. 
Before they decide to formally invest the creation, they need to consider several 
uncertainty issues that may affect the final outcomes: how much costs will be incurred 
of the creation; whether such creation will be successful; how much the profits will be 
if the work is successful; etc. The first consideration is the opportunity of success. In 
theory, copyright holders are unlikely to invest an unsuccessful creation because they 
cannot recoup benefits from such investment. In reality, almost every specific creation, 
novel, movie or music, must depend on ex ante market survey in order to anticipate 
potential costs/benefits and reach a success. Therefore, analysis that focuses on 
expected profits upon success of creation is more reasonable, because the failure of 
creation does not generate incentives to copyright holders.    
 After the analysis of initial stage, the second consideration is the costs of creation. 
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Basically, the costs of writing a text book or other expressive works (i.e. drama; novel; 
music composition, etc.) contains two categories. The first category is the costs of 
producing actual copies.264 The costs vary according to specific features of available 
technologies. Considering reproducing a book: a printer machine increases the costs 
with the increasing number of physical copies; an electronic copy, on the other hand, 
saves more costs than a physical copy. In addition, distributing and restoring physical 
copies also add costs of creation.265  
 On the other hand, the costs of producing actual copies can be detected and 
anticipated even though the differences exist in every technology. Imagine one 
copyright holder writes a novel online and seeks to make profits through his creation. 
He can negotiate with other online users; reach an agreement on the amount of 
payment; and send an electronic copy of his novel to the user. Under the 
circumstances, the cost of producing actual copies to the copyright holder is 
significantly low. All he need is a personal computer and valid network connection, 
and all the transaction can be finished between potential buyers and sellers. Thus 
copyright holders can eliminate the need to negotiate with professional intermediary, 
such as publishers, to facilitate reproduction and distribution. This eventually save 
substantial amount of costs and in turn increase available benefits. 
 The second category is the costs to create a work. Unlike the costs of producing 
actual copies, the costs to create closely relates to subjective elements. The costs 
264 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 37 (2003). 
265 Id. at 37. 
86 
 
                                                        
primarily consist of author’s efforts and time plus publishers and editors’ efforts to 
soliciting and editing.266 Such costs may vary from person to person because each 
creator has personalized method of creation and inequivalent capability in the process 
of production. For example, writing a drama is much easier and less costless to a 
professional writer than an amateur.  
 Despite the uncertainty, the costs to create still have certain theoretical grounds to 
measure. The degree of copyright protection would affect the costs to create. Basically, 
the less copyright protection is, the easier a derivative creator can borrow from 
preexisting work.267 Thus significantly reduce the costs to create a new work. On the 
other hand, if copyright protection add up to a high level, then subsequent creator has 
to either engage in costly search to look for resources in public domain or seek for 
licensing by costly negotiation from copyright holders. Both actions increase the costs 
to create. As a result, such costs reduce the incentives for creators to invest and lower 
the optimal number of works. Therefore, copyright damages as ex post protection 
should be adjusted to maintain sufficient incentives and optimal output of creation. 
 The costs of creation indirectly affect the incentives to copyright holders. Only 
the expected profits can directly trigger copyright holders to continue their creation. 
To calculate the expected profits, one needs to use actual profits minus costs of 
creation. The final amounts are the available benefits to copyright holders. So, every 
copyright holder strives to maximize the amount of expected profits by enhancing the 
quality of works, promoting the sales, and reducing costs. The more profits there are, 
266 Id.  
267 Id. at 68. 
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the more incentives will be, eventually leads to optimal number of production.  
 Such ideal situation, however, rarely exists because of the rampant free riding: 
copyright infringements. Infringers do not incur the costs to create, and even the costs 
of producing actual copies by infringers can be significantly less than creators. The 
costs of creation to infringers are greatly lower than that of copyright holders. Under 
the circumstances, infringers can drive the price close to or lower than marginal costs 
to compete with copyright holders in market. Such situation no doubt distorts normal 
copyright transaction, and reduces expected profits to copyright holders. To preserve 
enough incentives, copyright damages should be devised to maintain the expected 
profits to copyright holders unchanged.268 One way is to sufficiently compensate 
copyright holders so that they are not worse off as a result of infringements. So long 
as the compensations cover costs of creation plus reasonable profits, copyright holders 
will continue to invest on creation.269 Another method is to deter infringements so 
that infringers are not better off so that expected profits can be largely left unchanged.   
2. Deterring infringement 
 From the standpoint of effective deterrence, the ideal copyright damages should 
render infringers unprofitable. An infringer can be profitable either when he conducts 
an infringement without being detected; or, the final damages imposed on the 
infringer are much less than his profits. In reality, an infringer can either be detected 
or not. The probability lies in whether a right holder is willing to invest in detection, 
268 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 133, at 1619.  
269 From free market perspective, producers are entitled to earn sufficient return to cover their costs, 
including reasonable profits. So long as the price covers marginal costs the producers would continue 
production; also see supra contents in Chapter. IV. 
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which increases enforcement costs. Such action reduces expected profits of creators 
because additional enforcement costs are incurred. To maximize expected profits, 
creators should minimize or avoid all potential costs.  
 To invest in detection can be one option, yet not a reasonable one. A more 
rationale option is to update copyright damages so that such remedy can make 
infringers worse off. When an awarding of damages that is equivalent to profits by 
infringement makes an infringer no better off, the infringer will be indifferent to the 
choice between infringement or not.270 When the damages exceed the profits, the 
infringer will be deterred because he suffered mush losses than legally obtaining 
license from a copyright holder. After all, most individuals take all possible outcomes 
into consideration before they make decisions. People choose the object that provides 
the greatest reward at the lowest cost.271 
 How to calculate the amount of damages according to the probability of detection? 
Basically, the damages should be multiple to the profits because the probability ranges 
from zero to one (a hundred percent).272 A general principle is that the optimal 
multiple should be the reciprocal to the probability of detection.273 Imagine that 
regular damages to parking violators are $30, and the probability of being caught is 
0.5 (50%). Since only half of violators can be caught and subsequently pay the 
damages, the rest will still commit violation. To effectively deter the violation, the 
270 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 133, at 1620. 
271  Rational choice theory, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_choice_theory (last 
updated May.23, 2012). 
272 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 133, at 1620. 
273 Id. at 1621. 
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amount of damages should be $60.  
 The probability of detection, however, is more approximate than accurate. The 
probability is the numbers of detected infringements divided by total number of 
infringements. The problem lies in that undetected infringements affect the accurate 
number of total infringements.274 Moreover, even if one can accurately calculate the 
probability, the measurement of profits is complicated. Only the profits attributed to 
infringements can be treated as infringer’s profits for calculating the optimal damages. 
Due to the inaccuracy and complication, optimal amount is difficult to calculate, yet 
the baseline exists: a low probability of detection favors high amount of award. 
B. The Solutions: Two perspectives for problems of copyright damages  
1. Solutions targets upon statutory damages  
a) Limit the excessive amount of statutory damages  
The widely negative comments of current statutory damages should be the 
“frequently unprincipled, arbitrary, and excessive amount of awarding.” 275 Such 
awarding not only imposes unjust burden upon individual online users who merely 
want to gain personal enjoyment, but on some OSPs that have persuasive fair use 
arguments. Obviously, it needs to be limited. 
To ease the problematic situation, judges should exercise their discretion over 
statutory damages wisely and prudently to avoid excessive awarding. §504 (c) of 
1976 Act clearly provides that “…as the court considers just…”276, which indicates 
274 Id.  
275 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172, at 439. 
276 17 U.S.C. §504(c). 
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judges should award statutory damages within appropriate amount. Specifically, 
judges should take precedents into consideration when judging online copyright 
infringements. These precedents showed that some awarding of statutory damages 
proved to be quite moderate, while others are equivalent to actual damages of 
copyright holders.277 Even when judges enhanced the awarding, the amount usually 
tended to be two or three times of actual damages.278  
The rationale in the precedents can be meaningful instructions to statutory 
damages. For example, when judges believed that defendants infringed copyright with 
a fair use argument, they sometimes award the minimum statutory damages. In 
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood, the defendant unauthorized transmitted 
copyrighted radio through telephone line that made its customers view the 
advertisement.279 The court awarded minimum statutory damages upon defendant 
because the fair use claim was plausible to court, and no actual damages existed to the 
plaintiff.280 
Courts also award minimum statutory damages when infringements merely caused 
little damages to copyright holders and generated minimal profits to infringers.281 In 
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., the court awarded minimum statutory 
damages against the defendant who unauthorized duplicated the plaintiff’s articles.282 
The court reasoned that $250 could sufficiently compensate the plaintiff and deterred 
277 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172, at 474.  
278 Id.  
279 63 F. Supp. 2d 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
280 Id. at 427-28. 
281 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172, at 474. 
282 551 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1981). 
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the defendant because the article was written by a law school student published on the 
school journal, and did not seek for commercial benefits.283 Similarly, Doehrer v. 
Caldwell provided a closely analogous rationale. The defendant reproduced the 
plaintiff’s cartoon in his political campaign without permission.284 The court rejected 
maximum statutory argument by the plaintiff, because the infringement only caused 
harm to plaintiff’s reputation without actual financial damages.285 The court further 
noted that “…rigid application of statutory damages leads to absurd results…its 
deterrence should not be converted into a windfall where plaintiff only suffered 
nominal damages…”286 
Although the above precedents mostly occurred in the pre-digital age, some 
analogous features exist in online environment. First of all, online infringements by 
OSPs always have certain degree basis of fair use. For example, commentators argued 
that MP3.com should have a plausible fair use argument: It only streamed CDs 
originally purchased by subscribers, so copyright holders already have recouped 
financial benefits.287 Moreover, MP3.com did not begin its service completely and no 
evidence showed the plaintiff had suffered any actual harm due to the infringement.288 
As for OSPs, their profits do not bear direct connection to online infringements. Their 
profits either come from fees charged from advertisement or subscription fees of 
283 Id. at 582. 
284 207 U.S.P.Q. 391, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
285 Id.  
286 Id.  
287 See Garfield, supra note 314, at 18. 
288 Id. 
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certain services. None of the two can be attributable to infringement.289 Apparently, 
these facts should be squarely fit into the framework of awarding minimum statutory 
damages.  
Take individual users into consideration, the analysis should be the same. It is 
doubtful to conclude that Thomas gained substantial financial benefits by simply 
downloading twenty-four copyrighted songs in her home. Furthermore, Thomas action 
was due to “her desire to obtain music for her own use”.290 Obviously, individual 
end-users like Thomas do not seek for commercial gains. Non-commercial online 
infringers like Thomas hardly cause substantial damages to copyright holders. Their 
actions primarily concentrate on enjoying online music for personal comforts. Though 
they indeed commit direct copyright infringements, their culpability should not 
deserve harsh penalty. Modest amount of statutory damages should be a reasonable 
option.  
Another analogous feature is that the impact on copyright holders by online 
infringements. Currently no direct, convincing proofs indicate that online copyright 
infringement account for the major portion of lost sales on content industry. The ratio 
ranges from 0.7 percent to over fifty, varying according to specific circumstances.291 
Sometimes the actual damages to content industry are nominal, given that they have 
different markets and can shift benefits from one to another so as to make up for the 
losses. 
289 See supra contents in Chapter. III. 
290 See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. at 1227. 
291 See Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra note 136, at 12-13. 
93 
 
                                                        
Efficient copyright damages should deter infringement by proper degree of 
monetary punishment. Proper amount of damages can make infringers worsen off 
because infringers cannot make any profits by infringements. Since most individual 
users rarely obtain financial benefits through infringements, reasonable amount of 
damages are enough to make them unprofitable and deter future infringement. 
Accordingly, the disproportional amount of awarding in Thomas-Rasset was 
extremely improper.  
Someone may argue that the number of online users is astronomical and the 
probability of being caught is trivial compared to the total amount. Although 
individual users largely do not financially benefits from infringements, the probability 
of detection demands excessive damages awarding to deter online infringement. Lack 
of harsh financial penalty, online copyright free riding cannot be terminated. Such 
argument is highly popular among copyright holders because they sometimes realize 
the difficulty to trace all unauthorized use of their online works. The costs of detection 
impose heavy burden on them and make it an impossible mission.  
It is true that the probability of detection to individual users is relatively small, yet 
not impossible. Remember the RIAA initiated to file lawsuits against individual 
end-users who illegally distributed copyrighted music through P2P file sharing 
platform in the beginning of 2003.292 Approximately 35,000 users were sued during 
the five-year period.293 Technological advance made the RIAA capable of detecting 
individual online users. Copyright holders now actually have the capability to detect 
292 See Moseley, supra note 4, at 315. 
293 See Mcbride & Smith, supra note 154, at B1. 
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infringement. The chance of being caught of online infringers substantially increases. 
Under the circumstances, a relative high probability of detection favors modest 
amount of award.  
On the other hand, the important consideration lies in whether deterrence to online 
infringement only depends on harsh monetary penalty. Among all the caught users, 
only twelve went to litigation.294 Most disputes result in settlement. The settlements 
between the RIAA and online users usually amounted to thousands, which were much 
less than the disproportional award in Thomas-Rasset. Obviously, the RIAA did not 
rely on copyright damages for deterrence. Their purpose was to raise public awareness 
of protecting online copyright and “educate fans about the law and the consequences 
of breaking the law.”295 Therefore, effective deterrence does not require high amount 
of damages to online copyright infringement. 
Modest amount of statutory damages can still preserve sufficient incentives to 
copyright holders. As aforementioned, online creators can easily copy, store or 
distribute electronic copies through the internet in costless way. Progressive digital 
technologies greatly reduce the costs of producing actual copies. Meanwhile, 
copyright holders nowadays can either individually manage their works online or 
conduct transaction with the aid of collective society, like ASCAP or BMI. These new 
business models also lower the costs of creation. Moreover, P2P file-sharing platform, 
though sometimes illegal, indirectly increase the quantity of available resources and 
expand the public domain. As a result, the costs to create are reduced and in turn 
294 See Ciolli, supra note 155, at 1003. 
295 See RIAA , supra note 134. 
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stimulate the production of optimal output. 
b) Targets on correct party   
Online copyright infringements committed either by OSPs or individual online 
users. So, copyright holders have to target either one or both. Current practices, filing 
lawsuits against individual end-users by the RIAA, prove to be problematic and costly. 
From the standpoint of effective enforcement, OSPs are more suitable than individual 
users for copyright holders to target on.  
OSPs conducted either direct or indirect infringement online. As for direct 
infringement, OSPs naturally should be the targeting party due to their culpability. 
When it comes to indirect infringement by OSPs, secondary liability, the situation 
needs further examination. 
Online service providers, as the intermediary on the internet, are not greatly 
distinguished from their offline predecessors, given that they can both easily to 
monitor and control copyright wrongdoing.296 The intermediary, like flea market 
owners, can supervise the market at low costs and exclude persons who commit 
copyright infringement from his market. 297 Considering online environment, the 
situation is highly similar. Despite American Online once had hard time to 
differentiate unlawful transmission of copyrighted music from legitimate 
transmission, 298  recent advanced technologies enable OSPs to monitor users 
296 Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic 
Perspective, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 395, 404 (2003).  
297 Id.  
298 Id. at 404-05. 
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increasingly in cost-effective methods.299 Since monitoring activities become more 
inexpensive, OSPs can actually control infringing actions online. For example, OSPs 
can suspend internet service to a given accused infringer or even terminate his 
account on its website as penalty. Because social benefits partly lie in more sufficient 
protection of online copyright, OSPs should bear the burden to exercise their duty in 
order to facilitating enforcement. 300 So, targeting on OSPs with the menace of 
penalty can better force them to perform their duty.  
Even if digital technologies in the near future make OSPs difficult to monitor 
copyright infringements, OSPs still are capable of making them under control. An 
OSP can increase the rate for services and shift the costs back to users. Such strategy 
though seems unfair to legal users, will smooth down the burden to OSPs. The 
increasing benefits can be resources to afford high amount of damages on the one 
hand and discourage illegal use on the other hand. Such discouragement would 
eventually decrease the quantities of online infringement on a given OSP. After all, 
infringers want to exploit online works at low or no cost. They become legal users if 
they are willing to pay for the use, and are more sensitive to price increasing than 
legal users.301 In summary, targeting on OSPs is a reasonable option for copyright 
holders to enforce their rights. 
Pursuing intermediary rather than direct infringers had already been proved as a 
cost-effective method before the emergence of OSPs. Early in the 1980s, many 
299 Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 239, 268 (2005).  
300 See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 297, at 404. 
301 Id at 405.  
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companies sold software tools that facilitated computer users to pirated copyrighted 
games.302 The copyright holders of the games could either sue these companies for 
indirect infringements or users for direct infringements.303 Due to expensive costs of 
detection and litigation upon millions of culpable computer users, copyright holders 
eventually choose to sue a handful companies due to the relatively low costs.304 
 Based on above facts, copyright holders online should pursue OSPs rather than 
targeting on millions individual infringers. A lawsuit against an OSP like Napster or 
Grokster can give rise to positive benefits that not only protect copyright holders but 
enhance public awareness of online protection, and meanwhile cut off the channel for 
future distribution online by forcing these OSPs shut down or go bankruptcy. Suing 
individual users, by contrast, do not generate the above benefits but merely rise 
resistance and negative comments. 
 Some commentators argue that suing OSPs eventually leads to over-deterring 
innovation and block future benefits brought by technology progress.305 However, 
technology communities did not show much concern like these commentators. Shortly 
after the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Napster were liable for secondary liability in 
online music piracy, new online services arose to substitute Napster.306 Some of them 
established their operations outside US territory in order to avoid any liability.307 
302 Id. at 408.  
303 Id.  
304 Id.  
305 See Berg, supra note 127, at 317-21. 
306 See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 297, at 408-09.  
307 Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED,  
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/kazaa.html (last updated Feb.2,2003).  
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Others updated their technologies so that no clear party would be liable for 
infringements even if it was uncertain how effective the updating would be.308  
c) Clarifying the guidance  
 Most of the problematic situations we have discovered in statutory damages 
actually arise from the merger of two policy requirements in a single framework 
without clear guidance. As Paul Goldstein explains, “statutory damages are justified 
because actual damages are so often difficult to prove, only the promise of a statutory 
award will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce their copyrights and only 
the threat of a statutory award will deter infringers by preventing their unjust 
enrichment.”309 In other words, statutory damages operate to compensate copyright 
holders when damages and profits are difficult to prove on one hand, and deter 
egregious infringers by high level of awards on the other hand. In general, 
compensation aims at preserving incentives to copyright holders, and deterrence focus 
on reducing infringer’s profits. These two requirements, nevertheless, can be 
separated. Preserving effective incentives does not demand high level of awards, so 
long as the compensation is sufficient to cover the costs as well as reasonable profits. 
On the other hand, modest level of award can still deter infringements when infringers 
are not profitable. Therefore, a possible suggestion is to legislatively modify current 
provisions of statutory damages by separating into two subsections. Each subsection 
can be given more detailed guidance and focuses on specific purposes.310  
308 Douglas Litchman & David Jacobson, Anonymity a Double Edged Sword for Pirates Online, THE 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/lichtman041300(last updated Apr.13, 2000).  
309 See Paul, supra note 151, at 14:41. 
310 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra 172, at 509. 
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 As to enhanced damages, the related subsection can contain guidance that 
describes specific egregious conditions that justify the high level of awards according 
to relevant precedents. For example, willful and repeat infringes with constructive 
knowledge of infringements should be imposed enhanced damages.311 Such guidance 
should be treated more like exception when courts award statutory damages, and 
cautiously exercise so as to avoid unjust and inconsistent results.  
 Current maximum end is $150,000 per infringed work. The amount multiply the 
accused quantity of infringed online works often leads to astronomical figures, which 
is disproportional to actual damages of copyright holders. Therefore, the discretion of 
courts upon awarding enhanced damages should be limited, especially in online 
infringement. Another complementary modification is to change current maximum 
end from $150,000 to two or three times of actual damages as in other intellectual 
property damages. Basically, awarding two or three times of actual damages can both 
sufficiently compensate copyright holders and punish egregious infringers. However, 
such modification depends on reliable calculation of actual damages of copyright 
holders, which is sometimes difficult. 
 On the other hand, conditions regarding innocent infringements should better be 
modified so that courts can have flexible discretion to lower the minimum awards 
accordingly. A defendant becomes an innocent infringer only when he proves that “his 
infringing conduct was made in a good faith belief of his innocence, and he was 
reasonable in holding that good faith belief.”312 Such requirement essentially is 
311 Id.  
312 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03 [A][1][b] (Matthew 
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difficult for individual infringers to prove given that most of them have the intent to 
free ride online works. However, the point lies in whether individual users cause great 
harm and make many profits by online infringement. The fact, as discussed above, 
indicates the opposite conclusion. Individual users rarely financially benefits from 
unauthorized actions and cause much harm to copyright holders. As in P2P 
file-sharing cases, even the statutory minimum $750 per infringed work is still 
disproportional to individual users and impose unduly burden on them.  
 Lack of guidance also means prospective online users of copyrighted works have 
little basis to predict whether they would pay enhanced amount of damages or 
minimum amount if their actions are found infringement.313 Such unpredictability, in 
turn, leads to chilling effect upon potential users who need to build on available 
resources for creation under the menace of harsh damages even if they have 
persuasive fair use basis. 
2. Solutions to damages on actual damages/profit 
 Effective copyright damages should sufficiently compensate copyright holders in 
order to preserve incentives for creation. In theory, the amount of damages should be 
above the actual damages in order to achieve that purpose. However, exact 
measurement of actual damages can rarely be accurate in copyright dispute, and the 
situation exacerbates in online environment. As a result, most copyright holders prefer 
to statutory damages as monetary remedy to enforce their rights. Such preference, in 
Bender ed. 2009).  
313 Alan E.Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory damages to Promote Speech, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, at 42-43 (2010).  
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turn, causes frequent use of statutory damages as well as relevant problems. 
 In addition to the solutions that focus on current statutory damages, an alternative 
to ease the situation is finding reliable criteria for damages calculation. A high profile 
example exists in US patent law: reasonable royalty as damages. §284 of US Patent 
Act provides that the court may award “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer…”314 The provision expressively indicates the primary 
purpose of reasonable royalty is to compensate patentees and function as the bottom 
line of patent damages which offers the least amount to patentees, given that the 
licensing royalty approximate the fair market value to the use certain invention.315 
The US Supreme Court defined reasonable royalty in patent damages as “the 
difference between the patentee’s condition and after infringement, and what his 
condition would have been if infringement had not occurred.”316 When a patent 
infringement does not distort sales of a patentee, the patentee can still claim for the 
royalty fees that he could have reasonably charged from the infringer for a license to 
use the patent at issue. Under the circumstances, patentees can always recoup 
compensation to cover their costs.  
 In theory, the calculation method focuses on a hypothetical private transaction 
between the plaintiff and the defendant. It does not matter whether there is an actual 
transaction between the two parties. The strength of the methods is self-evident: it 
314 35 U.S.C. §284. 
315 Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 
MO. L. REV. 909, 915 (2009).  
316 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 337 U.S. 476, 507 (1964). 
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makes the calculation of actual damages easier and more plausible, because the 
licensing fee is pre-determined by the seller. The amount of royalty based on fair 
market transaction and best reflect the value of works. So, using reasonable royalty as 
damages can better compensate copyright holders than awarding inaccurate statutory 
damages. 
 Considering the application in patent law, reasonable royalty can be proper 
standard for calculation actual damages. The purpose of reasonable royalty is to make 
right holders not worse off as the result of infringements. As discussed in Chapter IV, 
copyright holders are willing to continue to create works so long as the costs of 
creation are covered. As rational persons in market, copyright holders must set the 
price of work above the costs of creation in order for profits. Under the circumstances, 
reasonable royalty as damages can make copyright holders profitable. On the other 
hand, reasonable royalty is determined by copyright holders based on all market 
elements, and originated from private transaction between copyright holders and users. 
Hence the price comes closely to real value of works. By introducing reasonable 
royalty into damages, copyright holders would not be worse off due to infringements. 
Therefore, reasonable royalty as damages preserve the incentives for creation. 
 Awarding damages on reasonable royalty decreases costs in copyright litigation. 
Judges can save time by simply refer to the reasonable royalty, rather than ordinary 
time-consuming calculation of actual damages. Moreover, by narrowing possible 
references to damages, the final awarding will be more predictable to both plaintiffs 
and defendants. Based on predictable results both parties may settle their copyright 
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dispute rather than litigation. This also increases the efficiency of litigation.  
 Someone may questions the deterrent effect on infringers by reasonable royalty as 
damages. Because of its predictability, an infringer may not be deterred when he can 
earn profits after paying the damages. Under the circumstances, infringements still 
occur. Moreover, copyright holders who filed the claim burden litigation costs. Even 
though reasonable royalty can cover the costs of creation, the litigation costs still 
impose heavy burden on them. According to a survey conducted by American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) in 2003, the median costs of copyright 
litigation were $298,000 upon discovery stage and $499,000 upon trial and appeal 
stage.317 Under the circumstances, they may be less likely to pursue infringement due 
to such burden. Their unwillingness, in turn, eventually stimulates online copyright 
infringement. To ease the concerns, a relative proper solution is to give courts 
discretion to enhance the amount of damages two or three times to actual damages in 
order for deterrence.  
 Another controversial issue is how to determine the appropriate royalty to online 
copyrighted works. Setting the reasonable royalty by governmental bodies can be one 
of the options, just like compulsory license in copyright law. However, such rates are 
debatable and usually outdated, because the governmental bodies do not participate in 
private market transaction thoroughly and the rates cannot reflect the supply and 
demand curve in online environment. Moreover, reasonable royalty functions when 
infringed works circulate in market under a uniform licensing framework. For most 
317 See Natividad, supra note 171 at 478. 
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individual creators, however, a uniform online licensing framework is difficult to 
negotiate. Each creator can claim a specific price based on his own perception on his 
works. Lack of such standard, courts would be trapped in complicated proof 
procedure.  
 To be reasonable and reliable, the standard can rely on existing online business 
models given that each kind of online work targets on different users groups and 
reflect the market demands. The success of online business models can best reflect 
true value of works on the internet. For example, In addition to selling hardware, 
Apple Company offers online business service: the iTunes. The iTunes online store 
provides downloading, managing and buying games, music and media. 318  The 
mechanism is “pay per-use”, that is, users pay for the works they access. Different 
works have respective price on its online store: songs are charged for $1.29 per-use, 
TY shows for $1.99 or $2.29, and movies for $14.99.319 The prices are acceptable by 
most online users and create huge financial benefits to the Apple. The company 
generates revenue at the rate of $100 million a year with 10 percent growth 
annually.320 Therefore, when awarding damages based on reasonable royalty, courts 
can take such price into consideration.  
 
 
318 Steve Lohr, the Power of the Platform at Apple, THE NEW YORK TIMES,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/business/30unbox.html (last updated Jan.29, 2011). 
319 The prices listed are not thorough to each kind of works. To view detailed information, visit 
http://www.apple.com/itunes/charts/songs/. 
320 See Lohr, supra note 319. 
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Chapter VI Conclusion 
Current copyright damages, inter alia, are primarily designed for copyright 
infringements in the pre-digital age. With the emergence of digital technologies, 
online copyright infringements function in a way quite different from offline 
infringements and impose great difficulty to right holders for enforcement. Ease of 
reproduction, widespread distribution, and high volumes compression significantly 
challenge traditional perceptions of copyright. These revolutionary progresses change 
the production and distribution of our culture. In response to such challenge, the 
standard of liability had been updated in order to fit online infringement into legal 
regulation.  
On the other hand, copyright damages as final remedy still remain intact. Recent 
online cases have showed problematic and unjust results because of the 
implementation of copyright damages, regardless the very nature of digital 
technologies. Specific problems are as follows: difficulty in proving actual damages; 
no plausible profits can be found; targeting on individual end-users who are less 
culpable; excessive, inconsistent awarding of statutory damages compared to actual 
damages of plaintiffs; and questionable statutory range under statutory damages. 
These problems not only depart from the original purpose of copyright remedy, but 
cause negative comments and resistance from the public.  
The problematic results are largely due to the misunderstanding of property rules 
in copyright damages. Property rules traditionally are dominant in copyright because 
remedy under property rules can force infringers back to transaction, which eventually 
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adds up efficiency. Nevertheless, the idea of internalizing all positive externalities of 
works is deeply rooted in almost every copyright holder. From offline physical world 
to online electronic realm, such idea does no change. Based on such idea, copyright 
holders always wish to recoup all externalities by ex post damages when 
infringements occur. Copyright damages, as a remedy under liability rules in theory, 
gradually contain effects of property rules when awarded in practice. In fact, property 
rules do not require the owner internalize all positive externalities. Therefore, 
copyright damages should functions under the idea of optimal remedy: sufficient 
compensation to copyright holders so as to preserve incentives for further creation; 
make infringers worse off and effectively deter them. So long as the above purposes 
can be achieved, no more awards need to be granted. 
It is time to reassess current copyright damages to online infringements: Limit the 
excessive awarding of statutory damages, and cautiously determine the amount 
according to actual damages and deterrent effect; target on large online entity rather 
than individual end-users in order to enforce right just and effectively; and clarify the 
guidance of statutory damages both to the willful and the innocent infringements in 
order to add predictability to statutory damages. On the other hand, difficulty in 
calculation of actual damages online still exists. To ease the problem, introducing 
reasonable royalty as measurement standard can be one plausible option. Although the 
deterrent effect may be weaken under such damages, courts can save time in 
calculation and make the final awarding more predictable to parties involved in 
dispute. In summary, Current copyright damages should be modified in order to better 
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adapt to advanced technologies in online environment. 
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